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Air Attacks on Neutral Shipping in the Persian 
Gulf: The Legality of the Iraqi Exclusion Zone and 
Iranian Reprisals 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 1980, Iraqi armed forces attacked and overran Iranian border 
positions, launching an offensive calculated to force the quick collapse of the 
Khomeini regime and to satisfy Iraqi territorial ambitions at a stroke. I After 
more than three years of huge losses to both nations,Z and with attrition working 
to Iran's advantage,3 Iraq began to seek ways to force an end to the war. 4 In 
February 1984, Iraq declared a fifty nautical mile exclusion zone around the 
Iranian oil depot at Kharg Island, in the northern Persian Gulf, warning that any 
ships entering this zone would be subject to attack." 
Since declaring this "exclusion zone," Iraq has carried out a series of air attacks 
against commercial shipping in the vicinity of Kharg Island, both within the 
declared zone and beyond its limits.6 Similarly, after warning that continued 
1. See Cottam, The Iran-Iraq War, CURRENT HIST., Jan. 1984, at 9. A detailed treatment of the 
complex historical and political pressures leading to the Gulf War is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
A short but thorough factual account may be found in Cottam, supra this note, at 9-10. See also Wright, 
Implications of the Iraq-Iran War, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 275 (1981). 
2. Cottam, supra note I, at 12. According to various news media sources, as many as 130,000 lives had 
been lost by February 1984. See, e.g., TIME, Feb. 27, 1984, at 63; MACLEAN'S MAG., May 14, 1984, at 50. 
3. Cottam, supra note I, at 12. Iraq's loss of oil revenue and resulting fear of any possible domestic 
instability weighed heavily in the Iraqi decision to widen its war effort. See generally id. This fear may also 
explain Iraq's eagerness to accept various initiatives by the United Nations to end the hostilities. For 
example, on September 28, 1980, the Security Council unanimously called for a cessation of hostilities. 
S. Res. 479 (1980), S/14244, RES. & Doc. OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1980, at 23. Iraq asserted its 
willingness to abide by Resolution 479, but Iran refused to observe any cease-fire as long as Iraqi forces 
remained on Iranian territory. W. LANDSKRON, ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 1980, at 
85,87. OnJuly 12, 1982, the Security Council passed unanimous Resolution 514, calling again for an 
immediate cease-fire. S. Res. 514 (1982), 19 U.N. CHRONICLE, (No.8) 21-22 (1982). Iraq quickly stated 
its continued desire to honor the Security Council's Resolutions. W. LANDSKRON, ANNUAL REVIEW OF 
UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 1982, at 98. Iran, however, rejected Resolution 514 and "dissociated" itself 
from any further Security Council action until the Council expressly branded Iraq as the aggressor. Id. 
4. For example, by threatening the Row of oil from the Persian Gulf, Iraq hoped to force both the oil 
exporting nations of the Persian Gulf and Western oil purchasers to pressure Iran into accepting some 
settlement. TIME, June 4, 1984, at 30. 
5. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1984, at A3, col. 1. 
6. For a representative description of the attacks, see TIME, May 28, 1984, at 50. Some vessels have 
been attacked as far as seventy miles from Kharg Island. TIME, Apr. 9, 1984, at 38. Accounts vary 
regarding the number of ships attacked. At the ~nd of May 1984, Iraq claimed that it had "destroyed" 
517 
5tH BOSTOl\ COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.2 
Iraqi attacks on shipping would draw reprisals against neutral vessels,1 on May 
14, 1984, Iran carried out air attacks on neutral ships in the southern half of the 
Persian Gulf.H These attacks, by both belligerents, have recurred in a continuing 
pattern of Iraqi attacks followed by Iranian reprisal, often after a respite of some 
days or weeks. 9 
This Comment examines the legality, under international law , of the attacks by 
the Persian Gulf belligerents against neutral commercial vessels. The Comment 
first discusses the continued viability of rights of neutrality under both the Paris 
Pact of 1928 10 and the collective security arrangements of the U.N. Charter. 11 
27 ships since February 27, 1984. TIME, June 4, 1984, at 32. Lloyd's of London, the principal insurer of 
the world's commercial shipping, listed 70 vessels "attacked" in the area over a somewhat longer period. 
Boston Globe. Sept. 13,1984, at 5, col. 4. On October 22, 1984, a representative of Lloyd's Shipping 
Intelligence Department stated that 99 vessels had been "attacked" since the war began in September 
1980. Telephone interview with Mr. R. Hooke, Shipping Information Services, Lloyd's of London (Oct. 
22,1984). Vet another source quoted Lloyd's as stating that 57 vessels had been raided by Iraq and Iran 
since January 1984. N.V. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at A12, col. 3. Reliable data remain difficult to obtain. 
Iraq has also mined the waters around Kharg Island. See NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1984, at 18. The use of 
mines in warfare at sea is a controversial issue in international law. the treatment of which is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. For a brief discussion on mine warfare in international law, see 2 L. OPPt:NHEIM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 471-73 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952)[hereinaf~ 
ter cited as OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT]. 
7. See TIME, Oct. 24, 1983, at 34-35. When Iraq, in October 1983, receiveo from France Super 
Etendard fighter-bombers, configured to carry Exocet anti-ship missles, Iran warned that if its oil 
facilities were attacked, it would close the Persian Gulf. ld. This warning was transmitted both by 
Iranian State Radio and by the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament.ld. See also MACl.EAN'S MAG., May 14, 
1984, at 49. 
8. MAC1.EAN'S MAG., Mav 28, 1984, at 30, 31. Iran acknowledged conducting an air attack against the 
Kuwaiti tanker Bahra and the Sauoi supertanker Yanlru Pride on May 16, 1984. See infra note 314. 
9. In the first week ofJuly 1984, Iraq struck at two tankers near Kharg Island. TIME, July 9, 1984, at 
57. These attacks came afier a temporary truce, which was honored by both belligerents for two weeks. 
TIME, June 25,1984, at 50. The next reported attacks took place in October 1984, when, after a 22 oay 
lull, the Iraqis struck a neutral supertanker which was en route to Kharg Island. TIME, Oct. 22,1984, at 
66. The Iranians retaliated on October 12 by attacking an Indian oil tanker, Boston Globe, Oct. 13, 
1984, at 3, col. I, and again the next day, against a Greek ship. Boston Globe, Oct. 14, 1984, at I, col 2. 
On December 3, 1984, after a six week hiatus, Iraq's warplanes hit a Cypriot supertanker near Kharg 
Island. N.V. Times, Dec. 4,1984, at A12, col. I. The Iranians retaliated on December 8, by attacking a 
Kuwaiti supply boat. Boston Globe, Dec. 26, 1984, at 9, col. I. 
10. The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy of August 
27, 1928.94 L.N.T.S. 59 (1929), 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796 [hereinafter cited as the Paris Pact]. The 
Paris Pact prohibits resort to war by any stale unless in self-defense, in concert with a general collective 
security system enforcement measure or as a measure of collective self-defense on behalf of a state 
lawfully engaged in its own self~defensive war.ld. See also R.W. Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at 
Sea, INT'L L. STUD. 1955, at 166-67 (1957). 
II. The collective security system created under the Uniteo Nations replaces ann improves upon the 
previous system of the League of Nations. See generally Tucker, supra note 10, at 174-75. Article 2, 
paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter prohibits the "use of force against the territorial integrity or polilical 
independence of any state." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Article 39 of the Charter establishes the 
Security Council as the body vested with authority to determine the existence of threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and other acts of aggression, and to make recommendations or take remedial 
measures in such cases as provided by Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Article 
51 recognizes the right of an individual state to use force in self~defense, pending action by the Security 
Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 157··69 (1948). 
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Next, the Comment analyzes the merits of possible Iraqi arguments seeking to 
legitimize the air attacks as justifiable either under a concept of "exclusion" or 
"war" zones, I~ or under the more traditional doctrine of maritime blockade. 13 
Finally, the possible legitimacy of Iranian reprisals 14 against neutral vessels, 
premised on alleged violations of international law by Iraq's armed forces, is 
examined. 10 The author concludes that neither Iraq nor Iran has valid justifica-
tion under international law to conduct air attacks on neutral commercial ship-
ping in the Persian Gulf. 
II. RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS 
A. Traditional Law 
Under traditonal customary international law, non-belligerents, or neutral 
states, possessed a general right to continue commerce with belligerents, pro-
vided such commerce did not favor or jeopardize the position of any particular 
belligerent. 16 Any state which fulfilled the duty of abstention and impartiality l7 
could claim the attendant rights of neutrality. I" Failure to remain neutral, either 
12. "Exclusion zones," characterized also as "war zones" or "security zones," have been declared by 
belligerents in order to justify the complete closure of specified areas to all maritime traffic, both enemy 
and neutral, and to jusitify a belligerent claim of right to attack any vessel entering such a zone. See infra 
notes 90-193 and accompanying text. Belligerents initially characterized these zones as "reprisals," see 
infra note 14, in order to provide a legal basis for their imposition. See infra notes 115-16 and 
accompanying text. 
13. The doctrine of maritime blockade is a long recognized method of economic warfare, in which a 
belligerent may legally bar access to an enemy's coast and seize and condemn any vessel in breach of 
such a blockade. See infra notes 194-274 and accompanying text. 
14. Reprisals are sometimes recognized under international law as legitimate responses, by a bellige-
rent in its conduct of warfare, to a co-belligerent's violation of international law. See infra notes 275-347 
and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 193,320-21 and accompanying text. 
16. See 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 549-51 (1968). 
Schwarzenberger lists five "basic rules" of neutrality: 
(I) A neutral State must abstain from taking sides in the war and assisting either belligerent 
and, in matters of discretion, deal impartially with all belligerents. 
(2) A neutral State must prevent its territory from being used as base of hostile operations by 
any belligerent. 
(3) A State not participating in a war is entitiled to respect by belligerents of its rights as a 
neutral power. It must, however, acquiesce in restrictions which, under the laws of war and 
neutrality, belligerents are entitled to impose on the relations between their enemies and 
neutral nationals. 
(4) A neutral State, as distinct from a neutralised State, may change its status to one of 
belligerency. Otherwise, the state of neutrality is co-extensive with that of war. 
(5) Any violation of the legal duties owed by belligerents and neutral States to one another is 
a breach of international law and entails the consequences of an international tort. (citations 
omitted) 
[d. See also, Tucker, supra note 10, at 165. 
17. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 549. 
18. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 202. Abstention and impartiality are, in a sense, conditions 
precedent to a claim of neutral status and its attendant rights. [d. at 204 n.17. 
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through commission of "un-neutral" acts,19 or by acquiescence in belligerent acts 
which compromised the character of a state's neutral status,"o legally allowed the 
offended belligerent to disregard the offending state's claim to neutral trading 
rights. 21 
The doctrines that evolved from the recognition of neutrality in traditional law 
had as a necessary presupposition that the belligerent parties held equal status 
legally, at least with regard to the 'war itself.22 This equality was based on 
international law's acceptance, prior to World War I, of a sovereign state's resort 
to war as a simple fact, neither legal nor illegaJ.23 Thus, a third state's decision to 
participate in the belligerency24 or to refrain and claim neutral status25was 
essentially a political, as opposed to a legal, question which turned on each state's 
estimate of its own best interests. 26 This pragmatic approach mitigated, at least in 
limited wars,27 the disruption of the international economic order. 26 
19. "Un-neutral" acts are actions by a non-belligerent state that discriminate to the aid or detriment 
of a belligerent, vitiating the "abstention and impartiality" required of a validly neutral state. See 
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 549-50, 624-25. One example of an "un-neutra]" act under 
traditional law is the trade in contraband. /d. at 616. But see Tucker, supra note 10, at 204-05 (recogniz-
ing that broad discretion is generally accorded a neutral state in its relations with belligerents). 
20. The so-called "Three Rules of Washington," which emerged from a U.S. Civil War dispute 
between the United States and Great Britain known as the Alabama case, are indicative of the 
"acquiescence" category of un-neutral acts. Specifically addressing commerce raiding by Confederate 
cruisers built in Great Britain, the Rules called for a neutral state to employ "due diligence" to prevent 
the fitting, arming, or equipping of commerce raiders, the recruitment of men, or the resupply of such 
ships within the neutral state's jurisdiction. The "due diligence" standard was reformulated by the 1907 
Hague Conference Convention XIII. 205 Parry's T.S. 395, 398. The reformulated standard provided 
that a neutral state satisfied the requirement for due diligence by using those "means at [its] disposal," 
including physical, financial, and other non-legal means, to honor its obligations as a neutral. See 
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 562-65. For a detailed discussion of neutral duties, see Tucker, 
supra note 10, at 218-58. 
21. When a neutral state violates or abandons its duties of neutrality, it can be considered either to 
have surrendered its right to demand suitable respect from belligerents for its neutral rights or to have 
ceased its claim to neutral status. Tucker, supra note 10, at 258-59. Even under the former, less 
consequential analysis, the neutral state forfeits its neutral protective rights. Id. 
22. Tucker, supra note 10, at 165. 
23. Id. See also SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 37-38. 
24. A state's choice to participate in an existing belligerency was as unfettered as the resort to war of 
the original belligerents. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 573. Even after a period of neutrality, the 
neutral state was free to change its status to belligerency at any time. Id. 
25. Although customary law did not require neutral states to issue formal declarations of neutrality, 
as their non-participation or abstention and impartiality entailed a presumption of neutral status, it was 
customary practice to make such declarations. Tucker, supra note 10, at 200-01. 
26. /d. at 165. 
27. In general wars, neutrality rights seldom have been respected for long. During the Napoleonic 
Wars of the nineteenth century, for example, Great Britain instituted a blockade of all neutral ships 
bound for French ports. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 630-31. Though Russia and other 
neutrals formed a pact of "Armed Neutrality" to protect their rights, Britain successfully persisted in its 
blockade.ld. In World War I, the belligerent powers argued that neutrality was far less important than 
the outcome of a struggle waged on issues transcending merely national interests. Id. at 634. World War 
II only emphasized this trend toward a voluntary and almost universal abandonment of neutrality. Id. at 
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The law of neutrality, however, provided no absolute right to neutral com-
merce. The same pragmatism which gave rise to neutrality rights recognized that 
a belligerent was unlikely to refrain from interference with its enemy's trade 
when great interests, perhaps including national survival, were at stake. 29 Thus, 
the doctrines of blockade and contraband were vital exceptions to neutrality 
rights, yielding a balance between neutral and belligerent interests. 3o These 
doctrines secured to belligerents the legal means to police neutral actions31 and 
ensured for neutral states the safety and preservation of legitimate trade. 32 
B. The Paris Pact and the V.N. Charter 
Beginning in World War I and culminating in the United Nations Charter, a 
fundamental change took place in the international law of war, with consequent-
ial effect on the traditional rights of neutrality. The Versailles Treaty,33 terminat-
637. When issues of great import are at stake, maintenance of international economic order becomes 
secondary to collective efforts taken in support of the rule oflaw itself. [d. See also Tucker, supra note 10, 
at 193. 
28. See generally QpPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT,supra note 6, at 624-29. See also SCHWARZENBERGER, supra 
note 16, at 592. 
29. See supra note 27. The tension between the belligerent's need to conduct effective warfare and the 
neutral's desire to continue a profitable trade has always been at the heart of neutrality disputes. Thus, 
when Great Britain believed it vital to blockade Napoleon's France, it did so in the face of armed 
resistance by neutrals, claiming that the "exceptional character" of the war justified its action. 
QpPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 630. 
30. See infra notes 31-32 for a description of the operation of the blockade and contraband doctrines. 
The attempt to strike a balance between the opposing interests of neutrals and belligerents is especially 
evident in the formation of the Armed Neutrality of 1780 .. QpPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 
629. Russia, speaking for the neutral states, claimed the right to continue neutral trade with bellige-
rents, subject to limitation only by legitimate blockade and previously agreed upon strictures on trade in 
contraband . [d. 
31. Blockade doctrine allowed a belligerent with sufficient naval force to halt entirely neutral 
commerce to an enemy's ports or coasts. For a more detailed discussion of blockade, see infra notes 
194-230 and accompanying text. A full discussion of the doctrine of contraband is outside the scope of 
this Comment. Briefly, customary law regarded trading in items or goods denominated contraband of 
war as outside the protections afforded legitimate neutral trade, though not necessarily an un-neutral 
act. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 618-19. In conjunction with a belligerent's right to visit and 
search neutral vessels on the high seas, id. at 595-97, contraband doctrine recognized as legitimate the 
belligerent seizure of items related to the conduct of warfare, if such items were destined for enemy use. 
[d. at 616. For a full discourse on contraband, see QpPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 799-830. 
32. For example, the notification required of a legal blockade, see infra note 206 and accompanying 
text, warned the neutral state that passage to the blockaded destination was prohibited. Furthermore, 
although blockade running, or breach, made the neutral vessel and cargo liable to condemnation by a 
Prize Court, the court proceedings theoretically gave the neutral a forum for redress. See infra notes 
225-28 and accompanying text. Commerce to open ports was subject to the contraband limitation, see 
supra note 31, though a cargo containing contraband and non-contraband items might be subject to 
seizure. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 617. Like all "rules" of warfare, the blockade and 
contraband doctrines sought to provide a regulated means for belligerents to wage warfare, in this case 
economic warfare, while remaining within the rule of law. [d. at 9-10. 
33. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919,225 
Parry's T.S. 189. 
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ing World War I, labeled Germany the initial aggressor in that conflict34and 
accordingly punished Germany for its illicit recourse to war,35 assessing damages 
in the form of reparations.36 The Treaty also included an attempt to establish a 
collective security system, the League of Nations,37 to deter future resort to war. 3H 
A more affirmative renunciation of the right to war was embodied in the Paris 
Pact of 1928.39 This general treaty bound its signatories40 to renounce war as an 
instrument of national policy. 41 Only war waged in self-defense4~ or as a measure 
of collective security in defense of another nation remained, at least in theory, 
legal..j3 
The goals of the Versailles Treaty and the Paris Pact were not realized. The 
progressive failure of the collective security measures promised by the League:4 
coupled with the ineffectiveness of the Paris Pact in preventing war:5 culminated 
at the conclusion of World War II in a more determined effort through the U.N. 
Charter to eliminate warfare as an acceptable extension of national policy.46 
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter explicitly forbids the use of force against 
the "territorial integrity or political independence" of a state,47 leaving Articles 
34. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 760. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. See also The Covenant of The League of Nations, 225 Parry's T.S. 195, 195-205. 
38. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE By STATES 217-18 (1963). 
39. The General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy of August 27, 
1928,94 L.N.T.S. 59 (1929). 
40. Both Iran and Iraq are parties to the Treaty. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1235 (2nd ed. 1981). The Paris Pact has attained near universality and may be 
considered representative of customary law. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 45-46. 
41. It is generally agreed that the Paris Pact stands for the principle that war is illegal unless waged in 
self-defense or under the authority of some collective security system. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 89. 
For the purpose of this Comment, the complex questions of the application of the Paris Pact to 
measures of force short of war, and whether technical definitions of war as "an instrument of national 
policy" restrict the Pact's ambit, need not be addressed. For a full discussion, see Uf. at 80-92. 
42. See supra note 41. Under the Paris Pact alone, each state is its own judge of whether an action was 
taken in self-defense against "impending attack," at least until an international jurisdiction, e.g., the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, see infra note 174, is established with cognizance of the question. SCHWARZEN-
BERGER, supra note 16, at 29. See also Tucker, supra note 10, at 170 n.ll. Pursuant to Article 39 of the 
U.N. Charter, the Security Council can render such a determination. See infra note 54 and accompany-
ing text. See also infra note 61. In the context of the Persian Gulf War, a claim by Iraq that its invasion of 
Iran was justified under the doctrine of anticipatory selt~defense would be possible, provided a strong 
showing could be made that Iran itself planned an invasion. See BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 257-64, 
275-78. 
43. See supra note 41. See also SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 46-47. 
44. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 216-19. 
45. Id. at 114. Though the Paris Pact did not prevent Axis aggression in World War II, a majority of 
states adhered to the Pact by taking discriminatory action against the aggressor states. Id. For this and 
other reasons, particularly the embodiment of the Pact's gist in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. 
Charter, the desuetude of the Paris Pact has not been raised. Id. at 113-15. 
46. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 50. 
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para.' 4. 
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39, 41, and 42 to vest the Security Council with broad powers to enforce this 
prohibition. 4~ As did the Paris Pact, Article 51 of the Charter explicitly recog-
nizes the legitimacy of self-defense. 49 Under modern international law, there-
fore, resort to war has become presumptively illegal, absent justification as 
self-defense or as a legitimate measure undertaken through a system of collective 
security."o 
C. Modern Neutrality 
Given the profound change wrought by the Paris Pact and the U.N. Charter in 
the legal status of war,ol the continuing viability of the neutrality doctrines, based 
as they were in the traditional view that war was a political right of every 
sovereign nationO~, must be seriously questioned. 53 
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter charges the Security Council with the duty to 
determine the existence of threats to, or breaches of, the peace or acts of 
aggression. 5 .' The Security Council is therefore competent to assess the legality of 
each state's action in the initiation of a belligerency, that is, which state, if any, is 
the aggressor. 50 Once the Security Council has determined the origin and nature 
of the aggression, it may direct members of the United Nations to apply sanc-
tions under Article 41, 5n or may resort to the use of military force as outlined in 
Articles 42 through 47 57 in order to restore the peace. 5H Whether through 
economic sanction or force, the measures directed by the Security Council for 
execution by member states would be, under traditional international law, un-
neutral acts .. ;9 Member states ignoring the Security Council's action by continu-
48. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 42. 
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 51. 
50. See JESSUP, supra note II, at 157-59, 162. 
51. [d. at 188. The concept of "war" itself has lost much of its former validity. The Paris Pact and the 
U.N. Charter have divided the use of force generally into self-defense and aggression, the former a 
legal response to the illegality of the latter. !d. 
52. See supra note 23. 
53. See, e.g., QpPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 639. 
54. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
55. Tucker, supra note 10, at 16, 171. See aLw JESSUP, supra note 11, at 54. 
56. Article 41 lists a number of sanctions which the Security Council might apply, including "com-
plete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations." U.N. CHARTER art. 41. 
57. Article 42 gives the Security Council authority to employ air, sea, and land forces of member 
nations to undertake demonstrations, blockades or "other operations." U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Article 43 
provides for agreements between the Security Council and members of the United Nations to have 
armed forces designated for Security Council use. U.N. CHARTER art. 43. Article 44 gives any member 
state whose armed forces are to be used in conjunction with a Security Council enforcement measure, 
the right to participate in the Security Council's decision. U.N. CHARTER art. 44. Article 45 supplements 
the provisions of Article 43 regarding ready forces for Security Council use. U.N. CHARTER art. 45. 
Articles 46 and 47 outline procedure for the creation ofa Military Staff Committee to assist the Security 
Council in its use of force. U.N. CHARTER art 46-47. 
58. See C.N. CHARTER, arts. 41-47. See also supra notes 56-57. 
59. Tucker, supra note 10, at 173. 
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ing trade with an aggressor, whether called upon to take specific measures or 
not, would be in violation of their general obligation to give the United Nations 
"every assistance" in actions taken.60 Thus, the legitimacy of a member state's 
claim to neutrality rights when the Security Council has declared an aggressor is, 
at best, problematic.6! Merely the fact that Security Council action may grant a 
right62 to a non-participant to discriminate against an aggressor-belligerent vit-
iates the first principle of neutrality, abstention and impartiality.63 Under an 
international legal regime based on an effective system of collective security and 
renunciation of war, therefore, neutrality rights are obsolete.64 
In fact, collective security under the U.N. Charter and the direction of the 
Security Council often has proved ineffective.65 The Paris Pact and the U.N. 
Charter both require that a competent international body make a determination 
that an illicit resort to warfare has occurred.66 Without such a determination, the 
belligerency has no legal status.67 This absence of legal status WaS precisely the 
situation prior to World War 168 which gave the concept of neutrality rights its 
foundation. 69 From its inception, the weaknesses of the Security Council system 
have been delay and difficulty in making a factual finding of aggression 70 and the 
often paralyzing effect of the veto power of the permanent Members.7! The 
subsequent political polarization of the Security CounciF2 has all but eliminated 
the possibility, at least for the present, of taking active and effective measures 
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5. "All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any 
action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any 
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." [d. (emphasis 
added). See also Tucker, supra note 10, at 173 n.IS. 
61. See generally Tucker, supra note 10, at 174-75. If the Security Council directs no specific measures 
against an aggressor, its determination of the aggressive and therefore illegal nature of a belligerent's 
action would still be authoritative under Article 39 of the Charter and should, consistent with the spirit 
of the Charter and the Paris Pact, oblige member states to refrain from aiding the aggressor. See supra 
note 60. See generally Tucker, supra note 10, at 174-75. 
62. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3S, at 402-04. 
63. See supra note IS. 
64. JESSUP, supra note 11, at 53; OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 642. 
65. Tucker, supra note 10, at 15. See also R. ARON, PEACE AND WAR 713-17 (1966). But see HENKIN, 
How NATIONS BEHAVE 166-70 (1979)(appraising in a somewhat visionary fashion the value of the U.N. 
system of collective security). 
66. Tucker, supra note 10, at 169, 171-72. 
67. /d. at 170, 177, 179. 
6S. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
69. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
70. JESSUP, supra note 11, at 194. 
71. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 664-66. 
72. See ARON, supra note 65, at 716. Though allies in World War II, the United States and the Soviet 
Union have since paralyzed the U.N. Security Council with liberal use of the veto power to support 
conflicting interests. /d. For an account of the extraordinary difficulty encountered by the United 
Nations in attempting to define "aggression," see BROWNLIE, supra note 3S, at 353-57. 
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against an aggressor. 73 As noted above, absent such action by the Security 
Council, the provisions of the Paris Pact and the U.N. Charter remain inopera-
tive.74 In such situations, the pragmatic need to minimize economic disruption, 
which was the very reason for creating neutrality rights,15 would justify the 
continued viability of such rights. 76 
D. Neutrality in the Persian Gulf War 
Though the Security Council has called upon both belligerents in the Persian 
Gulf War to cease hostilities77 and to respect freedom of navigation in the Gulf,7s 
it has not attempted to name an aggressor or to recommend measures to restore 
the peace. 79 Both Iraq and Iran may assert a claim of right in the initiation and 
conduct of the war.so Until and unless the Security Council8 ! declares an aggres-
73. The Security Council has been able to issue resolutions calling generally for cease fires or the use 
of peaceful means to resolve conflict, as in the present case of the Persian Gulf War. See supra note 3. 
74. Tucker, supra note lO, at 171, 177. 
75. See supra note 28. 
76. Schwarzenberger describes the modern law of neutrality under the United Nations as "poten-
tially applicable alternative patterns of legal behavior" involving a choice, through the veto power of the 
permanent members of the Security Council, between traditional neutrality and the law of collective 
security. SCHWARZENBERCER, supra note 16, at 665-66. 
77. Security Council Resolutions 479 (1980) and 514 (1982) called respectively for cessation of 
hostilities and an immediate cease-fire. See supra note 3. 
78. Security Council Resolution 540 (1983) called for both belligerents to respect freedom of 
navigation in the Persian Gulf. S.Res 540, 21 U.N. CHRONICLE (No.1) lO3-04 (1984). Security Council 
Resolution 552 (1984) called again for the belligerents to respect free navigation in the Persian Gulf, 
condemned the attacks on ships bound to or from neutral ports, and demanded that such attacks cease. 
S.Res. 552, 21 U.N. CHRONICLE (No.5) 75-76 (1984). 
79. See supra note 3; the Iranians rejected Resolution 514 and any further Security Council action 
absent a declaration recognizing Iraq's aggression. Id. 
80. See Wright, Implications of the Iraq-Iran War, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 275 (1981). Iraq bases its claim on 
the extortion of the Algiers Pact of 1975 which set the Iran-Iraq border at the thalweg, or main channel, 
of the Shatt-al-Arab river, a favorable decision for the then Shah of Iran. Id. at 277-78. The Pact settled 
a long-standing boundary dispute in Iran's favor in return for an Iranian withdrawal of support for the 
Kurdish insurgency which had threatened the existence of the Iraqi government. Id. The new Kho-
meini regime proved no less threatening, refusing to return territory forcibly acquired by the Shah and 
fomenting Shi'ite dissent throughout the Arabian Islamic nations of the Gulf. Id. at 278-79. Border 
clashes escalated in intensity, leading to the September 1980 Iraqi decision to use force.Id. at 279. Iran's 
claim of right would certainly be self-defense, as Iraq struck first, crossing the border into Iran. See 
Evans & Campany, Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomorrows, PROC. U.S. NAV. INST., Jan. 1985, at 33. 
81. Under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is charged, inter alia, with the 
responsibility of determining the existence of aggression. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. See also supra note 55. 
The question of the General Assembly's competence to label aggression is not settled. The case would 
seem weak, however, as there are many explicit provisions in the Charter with regard to the Security 
Council's competence and only a vague Charter reference to a residuary General Assembly power. See 
BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 333-34. In its recent decision in the case of Nicaragua v. United States, the 
International Court of Justice unanimously held itself competent to adjudicate the merits of the alleged 
U.S. aggression, explaining that the Security Council's authority in this area is "primary," not "exclu-
sive." See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, (Nic. v. U.S.) 1984 
I.C.J. 70, at paras. 89-98 Qudgment of November 26, 1984). See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 27,1984, at AI, 
col. 6; Comment, Nicaragua v. United States in the International Court of justice: Compulsory jurisdiction or 
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sor, the Persian Gulf War has no legal status.H~ This situation is the functional 
equivalent of the international order prior to World War l.H:J Non-participant 
nations that fulfill the duty of abstention and impartiali tyH4 should therefore 
enjoy the protections and incur the duties owed to a neutral under customary 
internationallaw. Hs Thus, the neutral nations whose ships have suffered attacks 
in the Persian Gulf may have a right to moral or material reparation, or to take 
retaliatory steps, if it can be shown that the attacks were without justification 
under international law. H6 
Iraq might seek such justification by characterizing its attacks on commercial 
shipping in the Persian Gulf as a lawful consequence of neutral intrusion into a 
valid exclusion zone. H7 Alternatively, Iraq might argue that neutral ships ap-
proaching Kharg Island were in breach of a maritime blockade and therefore 
legitimately subject to attack. HH Iran, on the other hand, must seek to justify its 
attacks as valid retaliatory acts under the doctrine of reprisal. H9 The merits of 
each of these contentions will be discussed in the following sections. 
III. EXCLUSION ZONES 
A. Origins 
Belligerents first employed exclusion zones90 in the major wars of the twen-
tieth century to meet the perceived need to control the flow of neutral trade to an 
enemy, without the commitment of the large naval forces otherwise necessary to 
Just Compulsion?, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. (1985). Whether an eventual finding of aggression would 
entail the same consequences as such an action by the Security Council is unknown. 
82. See supra note 67. 
83. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra note 18. 
85. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 404. See also JESSUP, supra note II, at 193; Tucker, supra note 10, at 
179. The United States has declared itself neutral in the Persian Gulf War. W. LANDSKRON, YEARBOOK 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1980, at 314. 
86. Tucker, supra note 10, at 259-62. In the case of the Robin MOOT, a U.S. ship sunk by a German 
submarine prior to U.S. entry into World War II, the United States demanded from Germany almost 
three million dollars in actual damages. U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INT'!. L. Doc.1941, at 45 (1943). 
Germany subsequently refused to answer the U.S. diplomatic note which had made the demand. ld. at 
46. As late as December 1984, the U.S. State Department had received no requests for espousal of 
claims against either belligerent in the Persian Gulf War, and was unaware of any claims being pressed 
by other nations. Telephone interview with Asst. Legal Advisor, Near-Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dept. of 
State (Dec. 3, 1984). 
87. See infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text. 
88. See inlra notes 254-74 and accompanying text. 
89. See inlra notes 311-47 and accompanying text. 
90. Exclusion zones have acquired a variety of names, e.g., war zones, operational zones, total 
exclusion zones, defensive areas. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note la, at 296 n.34. For the purposes of this 
Comment, exclusion zone will refer to any large ocean area which a belligerent declares closed to enemy 
and neutral shipping in order to prevent access to the enemy's coast. ld. See also SCHWARZENBERGER, 
supra note 16, at 432. 
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institute an effective legal blockade91 or contraband patroI.92 These zones trace 
their origin to two similar belligerent practices recognized by customary interna-
tional law: defensive zones93 and operational zonesY4 Defensive zones may be 
established by a belligerent in its territorial waters or waters immediately adja-
cent in order to provide close and effective control of its sea approaches for 
purposes of defense. 95 Operational zones are declared by belligerents to warn 
neutral shipping of immediate danger due to current or imminent hostilities in 
the delimited area.fJ6 Neutrals may be deemed to enter such a zone at their own 
risk and may be subject to belligerent control to prevent the neutrals from 
unwittingly interfering with combat operations. 97 Both of these zones are charac-
terized as limited in area9H and purpose, either defensive in a narrow sense99 or 
protective of neutral shipping, 100 and, in the case of operational zones, of limited 
duration. 101 
Exclusion zones are similar to operational and defensive zones in that they 
involve interference with neutral shipping, but differ sharply in execution and 
purpose. Exclusion zones are declared around enemy territorytO~ and can cover 
vast expanses of ocean, 103 and are therefore unrelated to the narrow objectives of 
91. Tucker,lUpra note 10, at 296, 301. See also OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 792. 
92. Contraband doctrine was based on the belligerent's right to visit and search vessels on the high 
seas in order to intercept cargo deemed contraband of war. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra 
note 6, at 799-S0 I. Contraband was broadly defined as goods that allow the enemy to carryon its war 
effort with "greater vigour." [d. See aLm supra note 31. 
93. Tucker, supra note 10, at 299-300. 
94. [d. at 300-01. 
95. [d. at 300. 
96. Tucker, supra note 10, at 300. 
97. [d. at 301. 
9S. ld. at 300. Defensive zones generally include a nation's territorial waters and a "very limited" area 
beyond.ld. For example, during the Vietnam War, South Vietnam declared a defensive zone within the 
three nautical mile limit of its territorial waters. Decree No. SlIN.G. of 27 April 1965,4 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'L 461 (1965). Operational zones are limited to the area of actual naval engagement. Tucker, supra 
note 10, at 30 I. 
99. As opposed to the most expansive definition of "defense," which could rationalize any act related 
to national security, defensive zones exist solely to enhance the immediate physical security of the 
declaring nation's coastal regions. ld. at 300. 
100. [d. 
101. ld. at 300-01. 
102. For example, the German exclusion zone in World War I, characterized as a "war zone," 
extended to the "waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel." 
Proclamation of the Imperial German Government of February 4, 1915. For the text of the Proclama-
tion, see The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 719 (S.D.N.Y. I9IS). • 
103. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 305-06. The British Order in Council of March II, 1915, merely 
stated that no vessels would be allowed to proceed to or from Germany; hence the entire eastern 
Atlantic was encompassed by the zone. [d. The German operational zone declared on February I, 1917 
extended to the waters around Great Britain, France, Italy, and the entire eastern Mediterranean. 
Mallison, Studies in the Law afNaval Warfare: Submarines in General and Limited Wars, U.S. NAVAL WAR 
COLLE(;E, INT'L L. STUD. 1966, at 65 (I96S). 
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defensive zones, 104 The purpose of an exclusion zone is, in fact, to eliminate 
commerce 105 rather than to prevent accidental damage to neutral vessels incident 
to inter-belligerent hostilities, which is the basis for a legitimate operational zone, 
Finally, exclusion zones are frequently enforced 106 by indiscriminate destruction 
of intruding ships,107 an unjustified result under the rationale of the legally 
recognized zones described above. lOS Clearly, an exclusion zone per se lOB must be 
distinguished from operational or defensive zones, and its legal merit must be 
separately evaluated. 
Two general types of exclusion zones have developed in international practice: 
the quasi-blockade 110 and the war zone. 111 British and German practice in the two 
World Wars, the former comporting generally to quasi-blockade and the latter to 
war zones, comprises the bulk of belligerent" 2 activity in this area." 3 
104, See supra note 99. Clearly, defensive zones cannot be legitimately premised on the declaring 
state's concern for coastal defense if the zone is placed around the enemy's coast. 
105. The declared intent of the British exclusion zone of World War I was to prevent goods of any 
kind from reaching or leaving Germany. Tucker, supra note 10, at 305-06. 
106. For example, from February 1, 1917 until the conclusion of World War I, and substantially 
throughout World War II, the German zones were enforced by unrestricted submarine warfare, 
entailing virtually indiscriminate destruction. See Mallison, supra note 103, at 62-86 (description of 
German tactics). 
107. German enforcement actions pursuant to the declared zones of February 1, 1917 and World 
War II made no attempt to distinguish neutral from enemy vessels, placing all at risk. [d. at 65, 76. 
108. Defensive zones allow the control of shipping, not its destruction. See supra note 95 and 
accompanying text. Operational zones may permit the capture of intruding neutral vessels and may 
relieve the belligerents of liability for damage done to neutral vessels incident to inter-belligerent battle. 
See COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 528-29 (6th rev. ed. 1967); Tucker, supra note 10, 
at 299-301. 
109. See supra note 90. 
110. "Quasi-blockade"' will be used in this Comment to describe the British type of exclusion zone, 
which is characterized by control and regulation of neutral shipping. See infra notes 114-23, 135-41 and 
accompanying text. 
Ill. "War zone"' will be used in this Comment to describe the German exclusion zones, which were 
characterized by destruction of neutral shipping. See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text. 
112. The famous "quarantine"' of Cuba instituted in October 1962 by the United States is distin-
guished from exclusion zones at issue in this Comment by several factors, foremost of which is the 
non-belligerent status of the participants. The quarantine was, in practice, closely related to contraband 
doctrine, involving visit and search of vessels on the high seas to prevent Soviet nuclear armed missles 
from reaching Cuba. For a thorough account of the crisis and the international legal implications of 
U.S. actions, see A. CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSLE CRISIS (1974). 
113. The use of unrestricted submarine warfare by the United States in its 1941-45 war against Japan 
has been described as an exclusion zone. See, e.g., SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 433. This zone, 
however, was directed solely at Japanese shipping, involved no neutrals, and is therefore of no direct 
concern to this Comment. See Mallison, supra note 103, at 89. Prior to the Kharg Island exclusion zone, 
the most recent declaration of a zone was made by the British in 1982, in the Falkland Islands (Islas 
Malvinas) War. Effective from April 12, 1982, the British barred all Argentine vessels from a circular 
zone of 200 nautical miles radius centered on the Falklands. THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON, WAR IN 
THE FALKLANDS 164-65 (1982). Again, as in the case of the U. S. zone in the Pacific, there was no neutral 
involvement. See M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, THE BATTLE FOR THE FALKLANDS 105,341,381 (1983) 
(including a list of Argentine vessels sunk within the zone). 
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B. British Exclusion Zones 
In World War I, the British adopted what has been called a "long-distance 
blockade," 114 in reprisal'''' for the declaration by Germany of the waters around 
the British Isles as a "war zone.""6 In essence, the British prohibited passage by 
vessels whose destination or origin was Germany. 117 Ships intercepted, whether 
bound for German or neutral territory, were subject to compulsory deviation to 
Allied ports, where cargo was discharged, contraband "H condemned,"9 and 
enemy goods ,eo seized. Discharged cargo, other than contraband, was not 
confiscated and no penalty attached to vessels carrying non-contraband. ,e, A 
later British Order-in-Council,ee modified this system to provide a legal pre-
sumption of enemy character for ships and goods intercepted, thus allowing 
condemnation by the British Prize Courts. ,e3 
The United States, the principal neutral power at the time, ,e4 strongly objected 
to the British reprisal blockade, giving three major grounds. ,e5 First, the law of 
blockade did not recognize interference with trade to neutral ports, ,e6 such as the 
114. OPPENHE'M-LAUTERPACHT. supra note 6. at 792. 
115. Id. See also COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 740. 
116. Tucker, supra note 10, at 305-06. 
117. Id. 
118. See supra note 92. The expansive nature of the contraband list was a notable development of 
World War I; the vast increase in the number of items which were considered contraband made the 
British system a target of serious neutral protest. COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 682-83. 
119. Condemnation is defined in admiralty law as the judgment of a court, i.e., a Prize Court, by 
which, inter alia, a vessel lawfully seized for an alleged violation of neutrality may be forfeit to the seizing 
government. BLACK'S LAW D'CTIONARY 264 (5th ed. 1979). The title to goods or vessels lawfully 
condemed by a Prize Court passes to the captor state with no compensation due the former owner. 
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 304. 
120. "Enemy goods" are goods of enemy origin, ownership, or destination. Tucker,supra note 10, at 
306. 
121. Id. 
122. Order in Council of February 16, 1917, reprisal for the German declaration of a war zone for 
unrestricted submarine warfare. Id. See supra notes 103, 106, 107. 
123. Black's Law Dictionary defines Prize Courts as: 
Courts having jurisdiction to adjudicate upon captures made at sea in time of war, and to 
condemn the captured property as prize .... In England, the admiralty courts have jurisdic-
tion as prize courts, distinct from the jurisdiction on the instance side. A special commission 
issues in time of war to the judge of the admiralty court, 10 enable him to hold such court. In 
the United States, the federal district courts have jurisdiction in cases of prize. 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1333. 
Bl.ACK'S LAW D'CTIONARY 1080 (5th ed. 1979) 
124. U.S. neutrality was declared at the commencement of both World Wars. OPPENHEIM-
LAuTERPAcHT, supra note 6, at 637-38. See also COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 665-70. The United States 
adopted a position of neutrality as early as 1818. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 631-32, 668. 
125. OPPENHE'M-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 792-93; Tucker, supra note 10, at 308-09. Though 
the British were not consistent in their use of the term "blockade," no other legal doctrine, save reprisal, 
was advanced; moreover, the United States chose to rely on blockade doctrine for the basis of its protest. 
Id. 
126. The United States based its first objection on traditional blockade doctrine and Article 18 of the 
530 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.2 
ports of Northern Europe, as legitimate. 127 Second, the British system did not 
affect trade between the Scandinavian countries and Germany, 128 and thereby 
violated the impartiality, or universality, required of a legal blockade. 129 Third, 
continued German trade with Scandinavia vitiated the effectiveness of the bloc-
kade. 130 The British response was both general and specific, stating that the 
"long-distance" blockade was a reasonable adaptation of traditional law to mod-
ern circumstances, 131 and thus remained in substantial conformity with the spirit 
of blockade. 132 In further support of the British case were genuine British efforts 
to honor legitimate neutral rights 133 and the actual high order of effectiveness of 
the blockade. 134 
Early in World War 11,135 the British reinstated the same basic "long-distance 
blockade" on Atlantic commerce. In the summer of 1940,136 however, the British 
initiated a new series of measures to restrict neutral trade and isolate Germany, 
the "Navicert" system. 137 This system was essentially one of control, requiring 
ships engaged in neutral trade to obtain prior British certification and approval 
of cargo and routes. 138 Warship interception on the high seas provided enforce-
ment for the system; 139 failure to comply with the British procedure 140 entailed 
Declaration of London, which prohibited a blockade that prevented access to neutral ports. See infra 
notes 207 -OB. 
127. Tucker, supra note 10, at 30B. The British "cordon" was placed so distant from the German 
coast that neutral ships bound for neutral ports in Scandinavia were forced to pass through the 
blockade. Id. 
12B. Id. at 30B. The United States also noted that Great Britain exported large quantities of goods to 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, neutral nations within the confines of the British blockade. 
Id. at 309-10 n.66. Since, by virtue of the blockade's action, this trade was exclusive, it appeared that 
Great Britain was illegitimately profitting from its blockade. Id. 
129. Id. at 30B. See infra note 209. 
130. Tucker, supra note 10, at 30B. A legal blockade must be "effective." See infra notes 210-24 and 
accompanying text. The United States contended that British failure to halt German trade across the 
Baltic rendered the British blockade ineffective in its entirety. Tucker, supra note 10, at 30B. 
131. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 793 n.1. 
132. Id.; Tucker, supra note 10, at 30B. 
133. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 793 n.1. The British made every effort to discrimi-
nate between bona fide neutral trade and trade destined for Germany, while the British restrictions 
which were imposed entailed less drastic penalties for breach than did traditional law. Id. 
134. Tucker, supra note 10, at 310. 
135. On November 27, 1939, an Order in Council instituted largely the same system as had been 
used by Great Britain in World War I. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 795. 
136. On July 31, 1940, Statutory Rules and Orders, 1940, No. 1436 instituted the Navicert system.Id. 
at 795-96. 
137. Tucker, supra note 10, at 313. A good description by a German Prize Court of the Navicert 
System may be found in Judgment of Dec. 1B, 1942, The Ole Wegger, Supreme Prize Tribunal, 
Germany, 12 ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'L L. 532 (1949). 
13B. Tucker, supra note 10, at 314. The system required, inter alia, any ship bound for or departing 
from an enemy port or a port through which goods might reach an enemy, to obtain both a ship 
Navicert and, for any cargo, a separate cargo Navicert. Id. 
139. Id. at 312. 
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seizure and a legal presumption of enemy character, making condemnation by 
the Prize Court of cargo, vessel, or both highly likely.141 
Both the original British "blockade" of 1939 and the later Navicert system 
were again justified as acts of reprisal,142 premised on alleged violations of 
international law by Germany in its unrestricted use of submarines and sea 
mines. 143 Though there was some neutral protest over the British system, the 
generally sympathetic conduct of the United States lessened the impact of such 
protests. 144 
C. German Exclusion Zones 
On February 4, 1915, prior to Great Britain's declaration 145 of its long-distance 
blockade in World War I, Germany declared the waters around the British Isles 
a war zone. 146 All enemy vessels found therein were liable to destruction on 
sight. 147 Germany provided neutral ships with "safe zones," but warned that 
entry into the war zone entailed peril for which the German government could 
not be held responsible. 14M Though not explicitly stated, the method of enforce-
ment was to be the submarine. 149 The German war zone did result in the 
destruction of many vessels, most notably the Lusitania. 150 Outrage and pressure 
140. Such failure to comply could have been either failing to carry a ship Navicert, or transporting 
goods partIy or completely without cargo Navicert authorization. /d. at 314. 
141. /d. 
142. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 792, 795; COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 740-41, 
747-48. 
143. The British retaliatory Orders in Council of World War I were premised on the alleged illegality 
of the German war zones, see supra notes 103, 106, 107, 122, while German unrestricted submarine 
warfare and indiscriminate mine-laying provided the legal basis for the British reprisals of World War 
II. COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 740, 746. 
144. Although the United States reserved the right to claim compensation for damages which might 
accrue, OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 795 n.4, from the war's beginning and increasingly 
until U.S. direct involvement in hostilities in 1941, the neutrality practiced by the United States was 
tilted toward aiding the Allies. [d. at 637-41. 
145. Germany's war zone was, in fact, the occasion prompting the British reprisal. See supra notes 
114-15 and accompanying text. On November 3, 1914, Britain had declared the entire North Sea a 
"military area," thereby creating a theoretical basis for a German reprisal. Mallison, supra note 103, at 
67. Although Britain did lay mines throughout the North Sea, it provided safe routes to neutral ports 
and accepted responsibility for neutral safety, actions sharply in contrast with the German retaliation. 
Tucker, supra note 10, at 297 n.35; OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 681-82. Thus, a 
contention that Germany's war zone was a legitimate reprisal for the British mine barrage in the North 
Sea should be dismissed as invalid due to the disproportionality of the German retaliation. See infra note 
278 and accompanying text. Crmtra Mallison, supra note 103, at 67. Mallison does not detail the 
reasoning in support of his conclusion that the German war zone was a legitimate reprisal action. On 
this issue, and throughout the cited work, Mallison's position on the legality of war zones and German 
reprisals remains, as far as the present author can determine, unique. 
146. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 678. 
147. Tucker, supra note 10, at 297 n.36. 
148. [d. See also supra note 102. 
149. See Mallison, supra note 103, at 62-63. 
150. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 489. The case of the Lusitania is discussed in 
depth in a subsequent admiralty decision in U.S. court. The Lusitania, 251 F. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). 
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from the world's neutrals, especially the protests issued by the United States, 
induced Germany to grant guarantees of safety for passengers and crews of 
vessels attacked in the war zone. 151 This change of policy effectively suspended 
German operations in the war zone until 1917. L;~ On February I, 1917, Germany 
gave notification that, as reprisal for Britain's continuing illegal blockade of 
Germany,153 a war zone for unrestricted submarine operations had been estab-
lished around the British Isles and France. 154 All ships, enemy or neutral, would 
be destroyed on sight. 155 Moreover, because of the British use of "Q-ships," 
armed anti-submarine vessels disguised as merchant ships, German submarines 
would attack without warning. 156 This was the first of the absolute war zones. 
In World War II, Germany again declared an "operational" zone around 
Great Britain and France,I57 warning neutrals l5s that passage through these 
waters was not safe. 159 Though inititially German submarines gave the inter-
cepted vessels' crews time to abandon ship, British anti-submarine efforts soon 
forced discontinuance of this practice and attack without warning became stan-
dard. IBo The Germans also employed aircraft and undisclosed mine fields to 
enforce the war zone. 161 
D. Legality of Exclusion Zones 
The British version of the exclusion zone, the "long-distance" or quasi-
blockade, 16~ can be rationalized as essentially a fusion and extension of tradi-
151. See Mallison, supra note 103, at 63-64. 
152. [d. 
153. For the legal objections to Britain's blockade, see supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. 
154. Mallison, supra note 103, at 64-65. 
155. [d. 
156. !d. at 67. 
157. [d. al 75. The operational zone's limits were approximately those of the "combat zone" declared 
by the United States in its Neutrality Act of 1939. The Neutrality Act of 1939, 54 Stat. 4 (1939), 22 
U.s.c. § 441 et seq. (1940). Among restrictions on sales of goods to the belligerent powers, prohibition 
of credit extension to belligerents and carriage of passengers to the belligerent nations, the Act barred 
U.S. vessels or citizens from entering the declared Combat Zone. [d. See also OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, 
supra note 6, at 635 n.4. The Act was substantially repealed in November 1941. Act of November 17, 
1941,55 Stat. 764 (1941). 
158. Mallison notes the German contention that "neutral" trade did not exist with Great Britain after 
1939. Mallison, supra note 103, at 78. Although their nations professed neutrality, ships engaged in 
commerce with Great Britain complied with the British Navicert system and carried goods which were, 
by British definition, contraband. [d. There was no reason, therefore, to give preference to such 
"neutral" trade. [d. This does not, however, dispose of the basic illegality of destroying any merchant 
ships, enemy or neutral, without prior warning and provision for crew safety. See infra note 179. 
159. Mallison, supra note 103, at 75-76; see Tucker, supra note 10, at 298 n.36. On August 17, 1940, 
Germany issued another warning note, informing neutrals that entry into the war zone entailed the 
possibility of destruction. [d. 
160. See OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 491-92; Tucker, supra note 10, at 64 n.41. 
161. Tucker, supra note 10, at 298 n.36. 
162. See supra note 110. 
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tional doctrines of blockade and contraband. 163 In both wars, the British sought 
to impose over neutral trade the degree of control allowed under international 
law but impossible to implement practically under conditions of modern war-
fare. ls, Whether so radical an extension of doctrine can be considered 
legitimized through subsequent international acceptance is problematic,165 due 
to the invocation of reprisal by the British to justify their actions. 166 For example, 
publicists have regarded the British "blockades" as legal reprisals, 167 while addres-
sing their legality as blockade per se with far less assurance. 168 British Prize Courts 
have also hinged their support of the long-distance blockade on its characteriza-
tion as reprisal. 16!' Thus, exclusion zones when used in the British quasi-blockade 
fashion may be legal, if only as a form of reprisal. 170 
No such approval attends the German war zone. Characterized in their ulti-
mate form 171 as incorporating indiscriminate destruction by any means ln of all 
vessels encountered in the expanse of the prohibited area, German war zones 
163. See generally Tucker, supra note 10, at 311-12. As the contraband list came to include all or 
substantially all items of trade and the Navicert system provided an expanded mechanism for regulation 
and control, the concept of blockade per se merged with contraband enforcement and lost its separate 
identity. Presumably the utility of formal rules of blockade was also lost. [d. 
164. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 296 n.34. Substantially all trade with the enemy could be defined as 
contraband under international law. SCHWARZENRERGER, supra note 16, at 649. This, combined with an 
effective traditional blockade, could halt virtually all trade with an enemy. The British system accom-
plished this end, not inherently illegal, through use of its quasi-blockade or exclusion zone. Tucker, 
supra note 10, at 296 n.34. 
165. Though customary international law may not have accepted broad changes in blockade doc-
trine, an extension of the doctrine of ultimate destination, see infra note 225, to include cargo, as well as 
the vessel itself, may have resulted from belligerent practice in the two World Wars. SCHWARZENRERGER, 
supra note 16, at 649; Tucker, supra note 10, at 309 n.65, 311 n.70, 316-17. 
166. Tucker, supra note 10, at 301-02. Although the "rather perfunctory" invocation of the reprisal 
justification for war zones may undercut, to some extent, the legal relevance of belligerent practice in so 
describing the zones, it should not be entirely dismissed. !d. at 305; see infra notes 167-69 and 
accom panying text. 
167. International law has accepted the British exclusion zones as reprisals, which are permissible 
breaches of international law taken in retaliation for an enemy's illicit conduct. See infra notes 275-84 
and accompanying text. 
168. Tucker, supra note 10, at 307; QpPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 683-84. Colombos 
writes approvingly of British practice as opposed to the German "lawlessness," but notes neutral 
criticism of the British retaliations. COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 743-45. 
169. See, e.g., COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 741-42. British Prize Courts held themselves competent 
to judge only whether the reprisal taken, i.e., the quasi-blockade, was a reasonable inconvenience to 
impose on affected neutrals, not the merit of the executive's decision to take the reprisal. [d. This is in 
contrast to other European Prize Court practice, specifically that of the German Prize Courts, which 
held that all measures relating to the Executive's conduct of war were outside judicial competence. [d. at 
743. See also Tucker, supra note 10, at 307 n.60. For representative British Prize Court cases, see The 
Stigstad, [1919] A.C. 279; The Leonora, [1919] A.C. 974. 
170. Tucker, supra note 10, at 307. The legality of exclusion zones as reprisals is a separate issue, 
dependant on reprisal doctrine. See infra notes 290-95 and accompanying text. 
17!. See, e.g., QpPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 683 n.!. 
172. Submarines, contact mines, and aircraft were employed. [d.; see supra note 157. 
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have enjoyed little, if any, recogmtlon as legitimate. 173 The Nuremberg Tri-
bunal, 174 specifically addressing submarine attacks by Germany within its opera-
tional zone,175 gave no weight to the German rationale that unrestricted sub-
marine warfare was justified legally, based solely on the declaration of a war 
zone. 176 Recognition of such a claim would entail the abandonment of all legal 
limitation on the conduct of war, as presumably within a legally recognized war 
zone, belligerents would have carte blanche to operate as they perceive neces-
sary.177 Clearly, there is no merit in a proposed rule of law that functions to 
sanction lawlessness. In the international law of war, new weapons or changed 
circumstances do not automatically create new law.l7B Similarly, mere notification 
of an intent to commit an illicit act l79 at a certain place lMo will not suffice to make 
the act legal. IMI 
E. The Iraqi Exclusion Zone 
Iraq's declaration of a fifty mile exclusion zone around the Iranian oil facility 
at Kharg Island 1M2 may be readily distinguished from the recognized operational 
and defensive zones. 1M3 The clear and stated purpose of the Iraqi exclusion zone 
173. Tucker, supra note 10, at 302; COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 743, 745-46; SCHWARZENBERGER, 
supra note 16, at 646. 
174. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. For a text of the pertinent parts of the 
judgment, see U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INT'L L. Doc., 1946-47, at 241 (1948). 
175. The Tribunal made its comments in the context of the trial of Admiral Doenitz, charged with, 
inter alia, waging unrestricted submarine warfare. Mallison, supra note 103, at 77. 
176. [d. at 79; Tucker, supra note 10, at 302 n.45. The Tribunal did not sentence the accused, 
Admiral Doenitz, for the charge of unrestricted submarine warfare, citing what it described as similar 
practice by the Allied powers, i.e., U.S. unrestricted submarine warfare against the Japanese in the 
Pacific and Great Britain's order to sink on sight all ships in the Skaggerak. [d. As noted, the U.S. zone 
did not affect neutral shipping. See supra note 113. The British zone in the Skaggerak was imposed 
during the German invasion of Norway and closely resembled an operational zone and was therefore 
distinguishable from the German zones. See QpPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 493 n.1. 
177. In the German zones, for example, neutral merchant shipping could expect to be treated as 
enemy warships, i.e., destroyed on sight by any available means. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 56. 
Acceptance of such an exclusion zone would entail a virtual abandonment of claims to neutrality rights, 
see id., at 301, and approval of essentially lawless warfare. See COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 745-47; 
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 432-33. 
178. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 650-51. Thus, when a Japanese court considered the 
legality of new weapons, specifically the atomic bomb, it held that such weapons must be "subjected to 
the examination of positive international law." Judgment of Dec. 7, 1963, District Court of Tokyo, 32 
ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'L L. 627, 628-29 (1966). In this case, the Japanese court found the use of atomic 
bombs against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to have been an "illegal act of hostilities" under 
international law. [d. at 627. 
179. The destruction of unarmed merchant vessels, without sufficient warning and provision for 
crew safety, is an illicit act under the international laws of war. See, e.g., COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 
786-88. The prohibition is even more stringent as regards neutral merchant vessels. [d. at 791. 
180. That is, the attacks could be made within a declared zone virtually coextensive with the area of 
the ocean, see supra note 103, or essentially any time a vessel is at sea. 
181. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 304. 
182. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
183. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. 
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is to halt Iranian oil exports from Kharg Island. IH4 No serious allegation could be 
advanced by Iraq that the zone is defensive of Iraqi sea approaches IH3 or protec-
tive of neutral shipping, which are the legitimate motivating purposes of the 
recognized zones. IH6 The Iraqi zone may be treated, therefore, as one of the two 
types of exclusion zones created by international practice in this century: either 
quasi-blockade or war zone. IH7 
Iraqi enforcement of the zone, characterized by indiscriminate attack without 
warning and with virtually no provision for crew safety,IHH precludes its consid-
eration as a quasi-blockade. ISH In fact, the Iraqi exclusion zone closely resembles 
the type of unrestricted warfare Germany conducted in its declared "operational 
zone" around the British Isles and in the Atlantic Ocean during World War II.IHO 
Thus, just as German war zones failed to justify acts contrary to the law, 191 so too 
must the Iraqi zone fail. Moreover, though Germany retained the possibility of 
arguing that its war zones were legal reprisals for British violations of interna-
tionallaw, 19" Iraq has neither raised such a claim, nor does it appear such a claim 
exists. 193 If Iraq is to support legally its attacks on neutral shipping in the Persian 
Gulf, it must seek to do so under the more traditional doctine of maritime 
blockade. 
184. See, e.K., TIME, Apr. 9, 1984, at 38. 
185. See infra Appendix I for a map of the region. Iraqi territory on the Persian Gulf is limited to a 
forty mile corridor of land, bordered by the disputed Shaat-al-Arab to the north. Kharg Island is more 
than 100 nautical miles to the southeast of the Iraqi littoral. The exclusion zone, the radius of which is 
fifty nautical miles around Kharg Island, neither reaches nor protects Iraqi soil. 
186. See supra notes 99-100. 
187. See supra notes 110-11. 
188. The great majority of attacks on merchant ships have been made by jet aircraft-launched cruise 
missles - the French export Exocet. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at A12, col. I. Such missles are 
usually launched at 25 to 35 nautical miles from the target, using the aircraft's radar to make initial 
contact. See THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDO", WAR IN THE FALKLANDS 167-75 (1982) for a description of 
Exocet tactics. Clearly, no warning is provided and no time given for crew evacuation. The indiscrimi-
nate nature of the attacks is borne out by a statement of the Iraqi Information Minister, "How can we 
know which ship our rockets hit?" TIME, June II, 1984, at 36. 
189. The hallmark of a quasi-blockade, control of neutral trade, see supra notes 163-64 and accom-
panying text, is conspicuously missing from the Iraqi exclusion zone. Another fact is also pertinent: the 
British reprisal of quasi-blockade did not entail the loss of neutral life. See COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 
530. The Iraqi attacks, on the other hand, have frequently entailed death and injury to the crews of 
neutral vessels. See, e.g., Boston Globe, Dec. 16, 1984, at 2, col. 6. 
190. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra notes 145, 153. 
193. In fact, the only allegation of illegal acts of warfare has been levied against Iraq for use of 
chemical weapons, an action prohibited by international law. See J. STONE, LEGAL CONTR,?LS OF INTER-
NATIONAL CONFLICT 556 (2nd ed. 1959). Iraq has allegedly employed these illicit weapons against 
Iranian infantry. See TIME, Mar. 19, 1984, at 28; Evans & Campany, supra note 80, at 38. 
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IV. THE DOCTRINE OF BLOCKADE 
A. Origin and Development of Blockade 
The traditional doctrine of maritime blockade was a recogmtIon under cus-
tomary international law of a belligerent's great interest in interrupting its 
opponent's trade with neutrals,194 thereby weakening the enemy's war effort. lfJ:i 
The right of belligerent blockade, in conjunction with contraband doctrine,1!J6 
was an integral feature of neutrality rights,197 providing necessary means for 
balancing belligerent and neutral rights 19H and for maintaining the international 
economic order. 199 The rules of blockade under customary law, for the most part 
formulated in the nineteenth century,~OO were largely codified~ol in the Declara-
tion of Paris of 1856~0~ and in the later and unratified 203 1909 Declaration of 
London.~ol 
194. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 10, at 283-84. The traditional distinction between strategic and 
commercial blockades, the former involving simultaneous and coordinated land and sea operations and 
the latter applying to sea operations only directed at an enemy's commerce, COLOMBOS, supra note 108, 
at 716-17, has lost much of its importance, given general acceptance of both forms of blockade under 
international law. See OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 770. 
195. See generally COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 714-15. 
196. See supra note 31. 
197. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 768-69. 
198. See supra notes 29-30. 
199. [d. For example, the desire to preserve world trade led the United States to oppose the 
institution of blockade, until forced to impose its own blockade against the Confederate States in the 
Civil War. See COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 716. 
200. See OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 768-69; COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 716. 
Though blockades were instituted by the Dutch as early as 1584, it was in the period of the Napoleonic 
Wars and after that usage created the customary law of blockade. [d. See also C.H. STOCKTON, OUTLINES 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37-59 (1914)(historical survey of the traditional law). 
201. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 628. The basis in customary law for the Declaration of 
London, see infra note 204, is discussed at length in Myers, The Legal Basis of the Rules of Blockade in the 
Declaration of London, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1910). 
202. 115 Parry's T.S. 2 The four points which constitute the substance of the Declaration of Paris are 
as follows: 
( I) La course est et demeure abolie; 
(2) La pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, al'ixception de la contrabande de guerre; 
(3) La marchandise neutre, a !'exception de la contrabande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion 
ennemz; 
(4) Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effeetifs, e'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force 
suffisante pour interdire reeUement l'aeees du littoral de l'ennemi. ((I) Privateering is and remains 
abolished; (2) The neutral flag covers enemy goods, with the exception of contraband of war; 
(3) Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not subject to seizure under an 
enemy flag; (4) Blockades, in order to be obligatory, must be eflective, that is to say, maintained 
by a force sufficient really to interdict access to an enemy's coast.) 
[d. at 2-3. The Declaration was essentially a codification of recognized principles. Myers, supra note 201, 
at 571. 
203. At the outbreak of World War I, the Declaration of London, as yet unratified, was adopted in 
part by the Allies, only to be abandoned by 1916. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 769. The 
Allies found themselves hard pressed to apply the formal rules of the Declaration, especially those 
relating to the standardized contraband list. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 187-88. In many of the 
provisions regarding blockades, however, the Declaration was representative of customary international 
law and therefore, though unratified, retains validity. See Myers, supra note 201, at 573-81. 
204. 208 Parry's T.S. 338. See STOCKTON, supra note 200, at 550-97 for committee commentary on 
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The modern law of belligerent blockade2oa is comprised of four major ele-
ments. First, the belligerent instituting the blockade must give non-participating 
states notification of its existence, duration, and bounds. 206 Second, a blockade 
may only be directed against an enemy's ports or coasts, or those occupied by the 
enemy;207 blockading forces cannot bar access to neutral ports or coasts. 20H Third, 
a blockade must be enforced impartially, against all vessels. 209 Finally, a blockade 
must be effective to be legal. 210 
This last and perhaps most important211 element of effectiveness is difficult to 
define closely, as it is essentially a question of fact 212 and therefore highly 
dependent on evol,:ing technology and changing circumstance. 213 The formula-
tion of the standard in Article 2 of the Declaration of London, based on the 
Declaration of Paris 214 and similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the requirement,m defines "effective" as meaning "maintained by a force 
sufficient actually to interdict access to the enemy's coast."216 Publicists, describ-
ing the effectiveness requirement as distinguishing a legal blockade from a 
so-called "paper blockade"217 or privateering,2IH have refined the formulation 
the Declaration. Admiral Stockton was the U.S. representative to the London Naval Conference which 
reported the Declaration. 
205. Belligerent blockades may be distinguished from so-called "pacific" blockades, which are gener-
ally considered measures short of war. See COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 465-69; JESSUP, supra note 11, at 
176-77. 
206. See, e.g., COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 722; Declaration of London, Arts. 8 and 9, 208 Parry's 
T.S. 338, at 343. 
207. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 629. 
208. ld.; Declaration of London, Art. 18,208 Parry's T.S. 338, at 344. 
209. SCHWARZENBERGER,supra note 16, at 629; Declaration of London, Art. 5, 208 Parry's T.S. 338, at 
343. 
210. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 778; Declaration of London, Art. 2, 208 Parry's T.S. 
338, at 343. See also Declaration of Paris, supra note 202, ~ 4. 
211. It is effectiveness which distinguishes legal blockades from "paper" blockades. See infra note 
217. Paper blockades may be directed against the enemy, impartially applied, and properly declared, 
but nonetheless be invalid through lack of effectiveness. See generally COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 
717-18. 
212. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 10, at 288-89 n.lO. Professor Tucker points out that a blockade's 
effectiveness is not merely a question of fact, but includes some matters of law .ld. See infra notes 266-68 
and accompanying text. 
213. See, e.g., COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 718-19. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue at 
some length in its decision, The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U.S. 510, 518-19 (1898). 
214. Tucker, supra note 10, at 288 n.lO. 
215. The Supreme Court cites the instructions of the Secretary of the Navy, General Order No. 492: 
"A blockade to be effective and binding must be maintained by a force sufficient to render ingress to or 
egress from the port dangerous." The Olinde Radrigues, 174 U.S. at 515. The Court then adds, that the 
danger must be "real and apparent." ld. The "danger" to which the Court refers is clearly danger of 
capture.ld. at 516. See also infra note 224. 
216. In its original French text, the Declaration of London defines an effective blockade as "maintenus 
par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement l'acces du littoral de l'ennemi." Declaration of London, Art. 2, 
208 Parry's T.S. 338, at 343. 
217. "Paper" blockades were an archaic belligerent practice of declaring an enemy coast or port 
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still further. Under this refined standard, an effective blockade must pose a real 
danger of probable capture to ships attempting to enter or leave the blockaded 
area. ~19 Thus, the effectiveness of a blockade may be evaluated generally~~O as a 
question of fact,~~1 and will depend on such information as the composition and 
capabilities of the blockading force,~~~ the size and configuration of the area 
blockaded/~3 and whether all these circumstances actually render entry and exit 
dangerous to the point of probable capture. ~~4 
A vessel in breach~~5 of a legal blockade, no matter what its cargo or origin,~~6 is 
subject to seizure by the blockading forces and condemnation""7 through pro-
ceedings in a national Prize Court. ~~g Destruction of a seized vessel is only 
permissible under conditions of strict necessity~~!J and only after a sufficient 
guarantee of crew safetvYo , , 
subject to blockade without the commitment of sufficient naval force to enforce the declaration. See, e.g., 
Tucker, supra note 10, at 288. 
218. Private ships were issued letters of marque , authorizing them to seize enemy vessels on the high 
seas. SCHWARZENBERGER,SUpra note 16, at 374-75. The Declaration of Paris abolished the practice. [d. 
219. See COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 718. Professor Colombos cites the "most probable" standard 
with approval. [d. Lauterpacht notes that an effective blockade will make a vessel's capture "probable." 
OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 782. 
220. In a situation where a belligerent seeks to enforce a blockade through means violative of firmly 
established rules of war, e.g., unrestricted submarine warfare, a blockade may be ineffective as a matter 
of law. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 289; see infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra note 212; The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U.S. at 513. 
222. See COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 718-19. For example, the addition of aircraft to a blockading 
force would provide for greatly increased surveillance capability. /d. at 719. 
223. For example, Professor Colombos notes that, in the Crimean War, the Latvian port of Riga was 
effectively blockaded by a single warship stationed in the three mile wide channel which gave access to 
the port. [d. at 718. 
224. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 782. Publicists assume that "danger" means danger 
of capture; throughout the literature there is no recognition of destruction as the risk run by vessels in 
breach of a blockade. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 10, at 289. 
225. "Breach" of a blockade is unpermitted passage to or from an effectively blockaded port. 
OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 782. The doctrine of continuous voyage, or ultimate destina-
tion, carried the possibility of breaching a blockade to its logical extreme; a vessel might be held to be in 
attempted breach of a blockade when bound for a blockaded port, even if an unblockaded port were the 
intermediate destination. See id. at 785-86 for a review of the U.S. cases which gave rise to the doctrine. 
Though initially resisted by some writers and explicitly rejected by Articles 17 and 19 of the unratified 
Declaration of London, belligerent practice has been consistent in its acceptance of the doctrine. /d. at 
786 n.5. 
226. A vessel in breach of a legal blockade, regardless of neutral standing or the non-contraband 
character of its cargo, was subject to seizure simply by virtue of its status as a blockade runner. See 
generally COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 729. 
227. See supra note 119. 
228. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 790. See supra note 123 for a definition of 
Prize Courts. 
229. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 487. Though practice differed as to whether the 
necessity of destruction was strict, according to the British rules, or merely militarily convenient, as 
under the Confederate commerce raiders' practice, it was generally established that destruction of 
prizes must be the exception, rather than the rule. /d. The Declaration of London, Articles 48 and 49, 
codifies this rule. Declaration of London, arts 48 and 49, 208 Parry's T.S. 338, at 350. 
230. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 488-89; Tucker, supra note 10, at 350. There is 
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B. Modern Application oj Blockade Doctrine 
The international practice of the belligerent parties III the two World Wars 
had a significant conceptuap:l1 impact on the law of blockade. The technological 
changes of modern warfare, including new weapons such as submarines, air-
craft, and mines, rapidly made the institution of the classic, close blockade 
obsolete through impossibility.232 At the same time, the previously unknown 
pressures of general and total war rendered the aggregate belligerent interest in 
economic disruption of the enemy far greater than residual concern for neutral 
commerce. 233 Thus, under the guise of reprisal,234 belligerents in both wars 
greatly expanded their measures of blockade through the use of exclusion 
zones,23:' abandoning traditional law 236 or simply ignoring it as inapplicable,2:l7 
thereby waging far more effective economic warfare.23~ 
In the wake of the World Wars, the viability of the rules of blockade under 
customary law2:l9 is unclear. Legally, the effect of international practice in the two 
wars cannot be said decisively to overturn existing blockade doctrine; all the 
belligerent actions leading to expansive maritime blockades were taken as repris-
als,241) and not as modifications of blockade doctrine per se. 241 Thus, the rules of 
consensus on the requirement that the captor of a prize must provide for the safety of the crew and 
retain the ship's papers, the latter to facilitate subsequent adjudication. ld. See also Declaration of 
London, art. 50, 208 Parry's T.S. 338, at 350. 
231. Belligerent practice may not have had significant legal impact on blockade doctrine. See infra 
notes 239-41 and accompanying text. Some writers, notably Lauterpacht, doubt the applicability of 
blockade principles after the extremes of belligerent practice in the two Wars. See OPPENHEIM-
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 795-97. 
232. See, e.g., COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 734-35. 
233. See OPPE"HEIM-LAU'I ERPACIlI, supra note 6, at 796 n.l. 
234. See supra notes 146-43, 153-56, 166-67 and accompanying text. 
235, See supra notes 90-113 and accompanying text. 
236. For example, traditional law was abandoned in the case of the Declaration of London, which was 
never formally ratified; the Allied Powers offIcially withdrew their previous partial application of the 
Declaration on July 7, 1916. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 188 n.13. 
237. For example, in response to neutral protests that the "long-distance" blockade instituted by 
Great Britain in 1915 violated the rules of blockade, the British claimed that the "peculiar circum-
stances" in which the blockade of Germany was necessarily conducted made the traditional rules 
inapplicable. See OPPEKHEIM-LAlJTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 793 n.1. 
238. See id. at 794-95. The economic isolation of the Central Powers was very effective, given the 
comprehensive nature of the British reprisal controls over commerce to Europe.ld. With the enlry of 
the United States into the war in 1917, the Central Powers were completely cut-off from neutral 
commerce. /d. at 795. 
239. Neutrality rights in general may be anachronistic. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, given the modern technology of warfare, blockade rules may no longer be practical. See supra 
note 232 and accompanying text. 
240, See supra notes 115, 142 and accompanying text. The legality of these blockades was judged in 
accordance with their legitimacy as reprisals. See supra notes 145, 168-70. 
241. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 316. Though, as noted supra note 165, belligerent practice ma} 
have established the doctrine of ultimate destination as applicable 10 both cargo and vessel. 
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blockade may be regarded as remaining unchanged by treaty or practice since 
the conclusion of the unratified Declaration of London in 1909. 242 In the practi-
cal application of the international law of war, however, the World Wars leave 
little doubt that in subsequent general wars, belligerent interests would outweigh 
concern for neutral trade and make formal blockades strategically undesira-
ble/43 and technological changes in warfare would make formal blockades tacti-
cally impossible. 244 
Some utility for blockade doctrine, as with customary rights of neutrality in 
general,245 may nonetheless be found in limited conflicts and special situations. 
Where the interests and power of neutrals far outweigh those of the localized 
belligerents, observance of the formalities and limitations of blockade doctrine 
may be expected of or forced upon belligerents by the international commu-
nity.246 In such circumstances, the only international law available would be the 
customary rules of blockade. 247 
The Persian Gulf War may be such a situation. The belligerents, Iran and 
Iraq, are fighting a localized war over local issues. 24H Virtually the entire interna-
tional community has chosen to remain neutral,249 The primary concern raised 
by the war, at least for the non-participants and especially nations of the indus-
trialized West, is the maintenance of an uninterrupted flow of oil from the 
Persian Gulf.250 The United States has declared publicly that it will suffer no 
disruption of this commerce 25 ! and may be willing to use military force to ensure 
~4~. This may overstate an argument largely technical in its merit. Lauterpacht contends that, 
though technically inapplicable to blockade doctrine, belligerent practice in the wars must be regarded 
as "development of the latent principle of blockade," presumably along the lines of the British Navicert 
blockade. See OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 796. 
243. See, e.g., SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 652. 
244. See supra note 232. See also J. SPAIGHT, AIRPOWER AND WAR RIGHTS 479-97 (3d ed. 1947). 
Spaight gives a descriptive account of the effectiveness of air attack on merchant ships through the two 
World Wars. The technical evolution of aircraft and guided missles has vastly increased the potency of 
such attacks. 
245. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text. 
246. For example, in the Spanish Civil War, both Great Britain and Germany forced the Spanish 
Republican government to respect the legalities of neutral rights. See STONE, supra note 193, at 572 n.8; 
CotOMBOS, supra note \08, at 456-57. 
247. Thus, after the 1949 conflict between Egypt and Israel, the Egyptian Prize Courts applied 
general rules of international law and specifically the Declarations of Paris and London. See 16 ANN. 
D[(;. PUB. INT'L L. 587. 591 (1955). 
248. See supra notes I. 80. 
249. Even the six nations bordering Ihe Persian Gulf - Saudi Arabia. Kuwait. Bahrain. The United 
Arab Emirates. Quatar. and Oman - have officially declared themselves neutral. Nonetheless. they 
may be quietly supplying money to the Iraqis. N.Y. Times. Nov. 30, 1984. at A9. col. I. The United 
States has also professed neutrality. See supra note 85. 
250. See. e.g .• TIME. Oct. 24. 1983, at 35. Approximately 40 percent of Western European oil. 13 
percent of U.S. oil. and 60 percent of Japanese oil comes from Gulf exporters. [d. These percentages 
rna)' have been reduced significantly in the last year. See Evans & Campany. supra note 80. at 41. 
251. The Reagan Administration has repeatedly asserted that the United States would not "stand by 
and see the strait [of Hormuz] or the Persian Gulf closed to international traffic." TIME. June 4. 1984, at 
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its continuation.~5~ It may be useful, therefore, to evaluate the Iraqi exclusion 
zone~53 under the customary law of blockade. 
C. The Legality of the Iraqi Exclusion Zone as Blockade 
The Iraqi exclusion zone as declared is a circle with a fifty nautical mile radius 
around Kharg Island. 254 While this zone blocks passage to the island itself and to 
some additional ports in Iran,255 it does not necessarily interfere with access to 
neutral ports and coasts, and is therefore within the geographic limitations of a 
legal blockade's scope. ~56 Notification of the existence of the exclusion zone was 
made public and widely disseminated by the news media. 257 The existence of the 
zone was also recognized by the U.N. Security Council shortly thereafter. 25" 
Because the formal requirements for notification contained within the Declara-
tion of London were never ratified,259 and because they were merely based on 
the diplomatic practice of the major European states at the time,260 a reasonable 
means of notification based on modern international practice should suffice. ~61 
Iraq's declaration of the exclusion zone and the subsequent international debate 
and notoriety on the matter are clear evidence of adequate notice. 2fl~ The impar-
32. This position represents a continuation of the Carter Doctrine of 1980, which declared that the 
United States had strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. THE NEW REPUBLIC. June 18. 1984, at 8. See also 
Wright, supra note 80, at 292. 
252. See, e.g., TIME, Mar. 12, 1984, at 35. 
253. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text for an evaluation of the exclusion zone per se. 
254. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also supra note 185. 
255. The Iraqi exclusion zone may bar access to the port of Bandar-Khomeini, for example. See infra 
Appendix I for a map of the region. 
256. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
257. Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, announced the commencement of the long-threatened 
"seige" of Kharg Island in late February 1984. TIME, Mar. 12, 1984, at 34. The declaration of the 
exclusion zone caused prices on the oil market to rise and drew world-wide comment and speculation. 
ld. at 34-35. 
258. See supra note 78. 
259. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 10, at 187. 
260. ld. at 288 n.9. 
261. /d. at 288. Professor Tucker states that while knowledge of a blockade is essential for breach or 
attempted breach, formal notification is not mandatory; notification may be satisfied by "common 
notoreity." Id. at 288 n.9. 
262. Awareness of the existence of the exclusion zone is evidenced by a variety of internationally 
prominent developments. For example, insurance rates for commercial ships sailing in the Gulf 
increased approximately seven hundred percent, from roughly one percent of ship's value in February 
1984, MACLEAN'S MAG., May 14, 1984, at 50, to more than seven percent by June 1984. TIME, June 4, 
1984, at 30. In addition, as early as December 1983, Iran was paying a premium to ships calling at 
northern Gulf ports, as well as implementing convoys and other security measures in response to Iraqi 
threats. TIME, Dec. 5, 1983, at 58. Moreover, the crews and captains of the vessels entering the Iraqi 
exclusion zone are aware of its existence. See, e.g., TIME, June 18, 1984, at 49. Clearly, all the relevant 
parties had notice of Iraq's intent to bring commerce in the northern Gulf to a halt. 
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tiality of the Iraqi enforcement of the zone presumably has been demonstrated 
by the long list of nations whose ships have suffered attacks. 263 
It is the element of effectiveness which Iraq's exclusion zone cannot meet. As 
stated above, effectiveness is normally a question of fact which would require, at 
a minimum, a lengthy discussion of Iraqi tactics264 and the number of ships 
stopped as against the :1umber which proceeded unmolested. 265 This evaluation 
need not be made, however, if the blockade's method of enforcement is itself 
illicit. 266 In that circumstance, the blockade may be deemed ineffective as a 
matter of law. 267 The Iraqi attacks do not, in any way, purport to subject vessels 
intercepted in breach of the "blockade" to danger of capture and condemnation, 
only to the danger of destruction. 266 Iraq's method of enforcement has been, in 
nearly every case,269 attack by aircraft270 armed with long-range guided missles. 271 
Attacks without warning on merchant vessels and with no provision for crew 
safety are violations of international law. 272 Clearly, the Iraqi air attacks, illegal 
and unable by their nature to effect capture - the only available sanction for 
breach i73 cannot be considered in the factual question of the putative blockade's 
263. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at A12, col. I (Cypriot supertanker altacked by Iraqis); 
Boston Globe, Dec. 16, 1984, at 2, col. 6 (Greek supertanker hit by Iraqi missle); Boston Globe, Jan. 8, 
1985, at 4, col. 2 (Panamanian freighter struck by Iraqi missle). Exocet tactics and the use of radar make 
identification of ships attacked, and therefore discrimination among ships of different nations, unlikely. 
See supra note 188 and infra note 271. 
264. It would be necessary to determine the composition and capabilities of the blockading force. See 
supra notes 222-23. 
265. A factual determination of the percentage of ships actually attacked while in the exclusion zone 
would be necessary in order to determine whether the danger of capture were probable. See supra notes 
219, 224. Given the uncertainty of the effectiveness standard, a good working test for effectiveness 
might be evidence of more ships stopped than missed. See generally Tucker, supra note 10, at 288. 
266. Tucker, supra note 10, at 289. 
267. ld. If every vessel entering the exclusion zone were attacked by Iraqi warplanes, the blockade 
would still be ineffective; by not subjecting the ships to the only legal blockade penalty, capture, the 
attacks are not even relevant to the question of blockade effectiveness. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 289. 
268. See supra note 267. See also supra note 184. 
269. In some instances, Iraqi mines have damaged or sunk merchant ships. See NEWSWEEK, June 4, 
1984, at 18. For a brief discussion on mine warfare in international law, see QpPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, 
supra note 6, at 471-73. 
270. Generally, the attacking aircraft have been French export Super Etendards. See N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 4, 1984, at A12, col. I. Aircrati are not necessarily illegal in blockade enforcement; they must, 
however, conform to the same rules applicable to warships. See, e.g., COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 737. 
Practically speaking, it is difficult to conceive of a legal blockade enforced solely by aircraft; it would be 
necessary to have at least one warship to carry out visit, search, and capture. Tucker, supra note 10, at 
289 n.13. During the Spanish Civil War, the neutral powers extended the limitations placed on the use 
of submarines against neutral shipping to aircrati. See OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 532. 
271. Exocet missles have a maximum range of about 60 kilometers or a little more than 30 nautical 
miles, COMBAT FLEETS OF THE WORLD 1980-81 at 1010. Couhat, ed. 1980), though they are frequently 
launched at less than that distance. See supra note 188. These missles are independently guided after 
launch and cannot be fired as warning shots or aborted once fired; once having acquired a target, the 
missile·s radar should guide it to a direct hit. See COMBAT FLEETS, supra this note at 101-02. 
272. See supra note 179. 
273. See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text. 
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etfectiveness. The lack of effective enforcement renders a blockade a legal 
nullity. "7. Thus, Iraq cannot successfully invoke the doctrine of blockade to 
legitimize its attacks on neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf. 
V. REPRISAL 
A. Doctrine 0/ Reprisal 
ReprisaF7,' doctrine recognizes a belligerent's right to take actions or employ 
means not normally admissible under international law in order to compel from 
its enemy the cessation of illegal acts and compliance with international law in its 
conduct of warfare. 276 Reprisals are regarded as a last resort, justifiable only 
when the enemy's illegality is serious and no other realistic method of redress is 
available. m Proportionality applies and requires that a reprisal's scope or gravity 
not exceed that of the offense to be deterred."7S Some writers:!79 include a 
requirement that the reprisal action be directly related in nature to the original 
violation,"HO though this is not generally held to be necessary.:!SI Finally, there is 
consensus that belligerent reprisals based on violations of international law must 
be directed at the offending belligerent. :is:! Difficulties in legal analysis arise when 
belligerent reprisals are directed seemingly at neutrals:!H3 or affect neutral 
rights. "s. 
Reprisals that adversely affect neutral rights have been recognized as legal. 
The British quasi-blockades""" of World Wars I and II were considered legal 
274. See, e.g., SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 628. 
275. The discussion of reprisal in this Comment is limited to helligerent reprisals as distinguished 
from acts of retortion. Under customary law, acts of retortion are pernlissible measures of retaliation 
for another state's cruel, unfair, or otherwise objectionable, though technically legal, acts. See COLOM-
BOS, supra note 10il, at 738; OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 134-35. 
276. Tucker, supra note 10, at 151 n.5. 
277. fd. at 152; COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 739. 
278. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 141. Compare Tucker, supra note 10, at 153 n.9. 
279. E.g., COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 739. 
280. fd. 
281. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 152, 153 n.9; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 453. 
282. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 139. It is necessary to distinguish the case of 
a belligerent entering neutral jurisdiction to prevent an illicit use of the neutral territory by its enemy. 
In the celebrated case of the AI/mark, a German auxiliary vessel laden with British prisoners of war 
entered Norwegian waters to evade a pursuing British force. !d. at 693. After requesting and being 
refused the assistance of the !,;orwegian authorities, the British destroyer H.M.S. Cossack crossed into 
neutral waters and freed the British prisoners. fd. at 694. This was considered a case of "self-help," id. at 
69.'>, rather than a reprisal against a neutral. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 256. 
283. Often, the stated object of a belligerent reprisal may be the enemy, but neutral ships become the 
actual targets. See supra noles 150, 155 and accompanying text. 
284. Though Greal Britain's quasi-blockades were arguably more clearly directed at its enemies than 
at neutrals, since neutral ships were not sunk. Nonetheless, because neutral ships were precluded from 
sailing to Germany, neutral rights to commerce without undue hindrance certainly were affected. See 
Tucker, supra note 10, at 305-06. 
285. See .Iupra notes 114-44 and accompanying text. 
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reprisals by British Prize Courts 286 and by most writers. 287 British assumption of 
an unprecedented degree of control over neutral shipping was held to be a 
proportionate response to Germany's illegal use of unrestricted submarine and 
mine warfare, and hence a legal reprisal,288 even though otherwise unjustifiable 
restrictions were placed on neutral rights of commerce. 289 Germany's counter-
reprisal,290 establishment of a war zone in which all vessels encountered were 
subject to immediate destruction,291 was not given legal sanction, however. 292 The 
enormity of the German counter-reprisal's violation of international law293 far 
exceeded the gravity of the original violative act, the British quasi-blockade's 
interference with neutral trade. 294 Thus, the German illegality remained unre-
lieved by the palliative of reprisal. 295 
A more basic flaw exists in both the German and British acts of reprisal and 
may be characteristic of any reprisal affecting neutrals. 296 When the violation of 
international law upon which a belligerent reprisal is putatively based was origi-
nally directed against neutral trade, the right of reprisal must be deemed to 
accrue to the belligerent that is receiving the trade's benefit. Similarly, since a 
legitimate reprisal may only be directed at a belligerent,297 reprisal actions taken 
against neutral trade must be legally construed as actions against the offending 
belligerent. Legal acceptance of the British reprisals in the World Wars would 
seem to indicate that these legal constructions are valid. 298 This may be trouble-
some, as doctrinal application of such a principle could allow belligerents to 
institute virtually any restrictive measure against neutrals under the easy cloak of 
reprisal. 299 
286. See COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 741-42. 
287. Id. at 750; Tucker, supra note 10, at 315; STONE, supra note 193, at 500, 503. Jessup has 
suggested a system similar to the British Navicert reprisal as a replacement for traditional doctrine 
should the need arise for rules governing blockades under the new, United Nations created, interna-
tional order. See JESSUP, supra note 11, at 219-20. 
288. See, e.g., COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 741. 
289. [d. at 742. The British Prize Courts held that Great Britain's reprisal was legitimate in that the 
degree of inconvenience suffered by neutrals as a result of the quasi-blockade was "reasonable," taking 
into account all the circumstances. /d. See also The Leonora, [1919] A.C. 974. 
290. See supra notes 145-61 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 173, 177 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra note 179; COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 745-46. 
294. Great Britain took pains to quiet neutral grumbling over the quasi-blockades, including diligent 
efforts to mitigate the inconvenience to legitimate commerce. See STONE, supra note 193, at 506-07. 
Moreover, the British blockade cost no non-combatant or neutral lives, COLOMBOS, supra note 108, at 
530, in great contrast with the German supposed counter-reprisal. [d. at 743. 
295. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 10, at 302 n.45. 
296. See supra notes 283-84 (describing ways in which supposedly inter-belligerent reprisals may 
affect neutrals). 
297. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text. 
299. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 258. 
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An alternative explanation for acceptance of the reprisal claims of the World 
Wars has been offered. Professor Robert W. Tucker, noting the legal in-
sufficiency of equating the belligerent's interest in the affected neutral trade with 
a legal right to such commerce in order to provide a basis for an act of reprisal, 300 
suggests that "reprisal" practice in the World Wars is more accurately inter-
preted as a new limitation of the belligerent's obligation to respect neutral 
rights. 301 Thus, in addition to the already recognized premise that a neutral's 
acquiescence in any belligerent's illegal acts absolves the opposing belligerent 
from the duty to honor that neutral's rights to greater degree,302 a belligerent 
may also base its conduct toward a neutral's shipping on the effectiveness of that 
neutral's efforts to police its rights.303 While this may not be a desirable rule,304 
nor an accepted one,305 it does resolve the legal ambiguity of supposedly inter-
belligerent reprisals which operate through restrictions on neutral rights. 
Though the position of the law on reprisals which affect neutrals is not 
settled,306 it may be safe to assume that proportionate belligerent reprisals, 
premised on an enemy's violation of neutral rights and not themselves grossly 
violative of the basic rules of warfare,307 may be legally acceptable. 308 On the 
other hand, characterization of flagrant violations of the rules of war309 in a 
disproportionate retaliation to an enemy's action as a legitimate reprisal will not 
suffice. 310 
B. Iranian Reprisals in the Persian Gulf 
Beginning in May 1984,311 Iran put into effect its oft asserted threat of 
retaliation312 for continued Iraqi attacks on commercial shipping in the exclusion 
300. !d. at 257 n.28. 
301. Id. at 255. 
302. Id. at 254; OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 678. 
303. Tucker, supra note 10, at 256-57. 
304. If the effectiveness of each state's "policing'" efforts is to be a limit on that state's neutral rights, 
neutral states may tend to rely on the use of force to protect their interests, thereby potentially widening 
conflicts. Thus, Saudi Arabia's destruction of two Iranians warplanes over the Persian Gulf, see TIME, 
June 18, 1984, at 44, may be seen as a demonstration of the Saudis' resolve to preserve their rights. 
305. Tucker, supra note 10, at 256 n.27. Tucker himself notes that his position is "far from being 
shared by many writers." ld. 
306. The law on belliegernt reprisals which affect neutrals ranges from Mallison's seemingly uncon-
ditional acceptance, seeMaliison.supranotelO3.at 66-67, to flat rejection as illicit. See, e.g., Tucker, supra 
note 10, at 255 n.24. 
307. See, e.g., SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 16, at 453. 
308. For example, the British quasi-blockades were widely considered legally acceptable reprisals. See 
supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text. 
309. Destruction of merchant ships without provision for crew safety is a violation of the rules of war. 
See supra 179, 230 and 270. 
310. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 302 n.45. The rejection of German war zones as legitimate reprisals 
clearly indicates that such extreme measures of retaliation, which primarily affect neutrals, are invalid 
under international law. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text. 
311. See MACLEAN'S MAG., May 28, 1984, at 30. The Iranians launched air attacks on a Kuwaiti tanker 
and a Saudi supertanker, heavily damaging the latter. !d. 
312. See, e.g., TIME, Feb. 27, 1984, at 63. 
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zone declared around the Iranian oil facility at Kharg Island. 313 In the seven-
month period following its first retaliatory action, Iran has committed several 
additional strikes. 314 The ships fired upon were all neutral vessels,:l!.; for the most 
part of nations outside the Persian Gulf region,316 engaged in the transport of 
Saudi or Kuwaiti oil far to the south of the Iraqi exclusion zone. 317 Iran has called 
these attacks retaliatory in nature, taken in reprisal for Iraqi attacks on shipping 
bound for or departing from Iran. 31H A determination must be made as to 
whether these attacks can be justified as legal reprisals under international law . 3!9 
The basis for the putative reprisals is Iraqi enforcement of its exclusion zone 
through the employment of air-launched cruise missile attacks on intruding 
vessels.3~O Assuming these attacks are illegaJ321 and therefore sufficient basis for a 
reprisal, the Iranians must claim the reprisal right accrues to them.a"2 While it is 
clear that the Iraqi attacks violate the rights of the neutrals whose ships have 
been attacked,323 there is no such clarity that Iranian rights,324 as distinguished 
from interests,325 have been violated, as there is no recognized belligerent right 
to neutral commerce.326 The legal acceptance of the British reprisals during the 
World Wars, however, provides some basis for an Iranian claim to reprisal 
313. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also note 185. 
314. In addition to the two vessels identified supra note 311, the following ships have been attacked in 
circumstances indicating Iran as the culprit (i.e., far outside the exclusion zone and with no subsequent 
Iraqi communique claiming credit for the attack): The Chemical Venture, a Liberian supertanker, TIME, 
June 4, 1984, at 30; the fag Pari, an Indian oil tanker, Boston Globe, Oct. 13, 1984, at 3, col. I; the Gas 
Fountain, a Greek gas tanker, Boston Globe, Oct. 14, 1984, at I, col. 2; a Kuwaiti supply boat, Boston 
Globe, Dec. 26, 1984, at 9, col. I (attack took place on Dec. 8); the Aegis Cosmic, a Greek freighter, Boston 
Globe, Dec. 18, 1984, at 3, col. I; the Kanchenjunga, an Indian supertanker, Boston Globe, Dec. 27, 
1984, at I, col. 5; the Serifos, a Greek tanker (missile apparently fired from an Iranian warship), Boston 
Globe, Jan. 28, 1985, at 3, col. 1. This list may not be complete, as no single, definitive source of 
information on the attacks is currently available. 
315. The ships attacked include Greek, Liberian, Indian, Spanish, Kuwaiti, and Saudi vessels. See 
supra note 314. 
316. After the first two attacks on ships registered to Persian Gulf nations, see supra note 311, only a 
single attack on a small Kuwaiti supply vessel has been reported. See supra note 314. 
317. Generally, the attacks have taken place near the Saudi coast or in the central Gulf. See, e.g., 
Boston Globe, Oct. 14, 1984, at I, col. 2. 
318. MACLEAN'S MAC., May 28, 1984, at 30. 
319. No other explanation of the attacks' legitimacy has been offered by Iran, id., and any possible 
justification under traditional blockade doctrine is precluded by, inter alia, the illicit scope of attacks on 
ships bound to or from neutral ports. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text. 
320. See supra note 188. 
321. The position taken in this Comment is that the Iraqi attacks are illegal. See supra notes 188-93, 
264-74 and accompanying text. 
322. Reprisal rights accrue only to the injured state. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHl',supra note 6, 
at 136; Tucker, supra note 10, at 257 n.28. 
323. See supra note 16. Neutrals have a general right to continue commerce, subject only to the 
recognized restrictions of blockade and contraband. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
324. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 257 n.28. 
325. Iran's interest, however vital, in maintaining its trade in oil cannot be equated with a right in 
international law, at least not for purposes of reprisal. /d. 
326. See generally Tucker, supra note 10, at 257 n.2B. In fact, the right involved is the neutral state's, 
under the scheme of neutrality rights. /d.; see supra note 16. 
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rights, despite the seeming logical incongruity.327 In addition, Iranian vessels 
have, on occasion, been attacked in the exclusion zone, providing on those 
occasions an independent basis for Iran's assertion of such rights. 32M The validity 
of Iran's claim against Iraq's exclusion zone attacks cannot be summarily dis-
missed. 
Once one accepts the right of Iran to some reprisal, the important legal 
considerations become the target and manner of the reprisal actions. 329 That is, a 
determination must be made of the reasonableness33o of Iranian attacks on 
neutral ships using methods similar to those which initiated the reprisal. 331 The 
same theoretical questions regarding the belligerent's right to take reprisal action 
for violation of neutrals' rights also arise in connection with the valid target of a 
reprisal. 332 If Iran does in fact have the right to retaliate for Iraq's attacks, the 
only legitimate target for the retaliatory attacks would be Iraq.333 Here, any 
similarity to the British reprisals breaks down. The British system of quasi-
blockade, instituted in reprisal for German submarine warfare, restricted the 
rights of neutral trade by cutting off commerce with Germany, which was 
certainly the target of the reprisals.334 Iran, in contrast, has attacked neutral ships 
trading with neutral nations;335 presumably such attacks are intended to bring 
neutral pressure upon Iraq to end the exclusion zone around Kharg Island. 336 
While possibly good political strategy, this reasoning cannot meet even the 
indirect linkage between the original perpetrator of an international illegality 
and the eventual object of the reprisal required by customary law.337 Thus, while 
the Iranian reprisals are arguably proportionate338 and clearly directed at obtain-
ing a cessation of the Iraqi illegality,339 they are not directed at Iraq, the only 
327. See supra notes 285-87, 298 and accompanying text. 
328. See, e.g., TIME, May 28, 1984, at 51 (Iraqis attack Iranian owned ship, the Tam·iz). 
329. See supra notes 278, 282 and accompanying text. 
330. See supra note 289. 
331. Nearly all the Iranian reprisal attacks have been made by aircraft firing rockets. See, e.g., Boston 
Globe, Oct. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 2; see also supra note 314. 
332. See supra note 283, note 297 and accompanying text. 
333. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. Either Iraq's own ships, or at the very least, trade 
with Iraq, might be considered proper targets of a valid reprisal, given the acceptance of the British 
reprisals which affected neutrals. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text. Since Iraq's oil facilities 
on the Persian Gulf were destroyed early in the war, however, no Iraqi oil and no Iraqi ships have 
passed through the Gulf. See Evans & Campany, supra note 80, at 37. 
334. See supra note 105. See also supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text. 
335. See supra note 315. 
336. See, e.g., MACLEAN'S MAG., May 28, 1984, at 30. 
337. The "indirect linkage" between the actual object of a reprisal and the legal object, i.e., the 
original wrongdoer, may have been accepted in the case of the British quasi-blockades' interference 
with neutral commerce to Germany. See supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text. Thus, though only 
neutrals were affected, the object of the reprisal was still Germany. See supra notes 296-98 and 
accompanying text. 
338. The Iranian attacks employ essentially the same methods, see supra note 332 and accompanying 
text, though against far fewer ships. Iran has attacked about 10 vessels in retaliation for as many as 80 
Iraqi attacks. See supra notes 6 and 314; N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1985, at A5, col. 3. 
339. See supra note 336. The pattern of Iranian attacks bears out this contention. The Iranians have 
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valid target, and cannot constitute legitimate reprisals. 340 
The Iranian reprisals are also illegitimate under Professor Tucker's analysis. 341 
A possible Iranian contention that the ineffectiveness of neutral efforts to police 
their rights allows Iran to behave similarly toward neutrals would go far beyond 
the functional context of the Tucker analysis. 342 When limited to neutrality rights 
per se, 343 the inability of neutrals to enforce their rights against Iraq, witnessed by 
the continuation of Iraqi efforts to enforce the Kharg Island exclusion zone, may 
provide some legal basis, according to Professor Tucker's argument, for a like 
Iranian disregard of neutrality rights. 344 But an attack without warning and 
without provision for crew safety against an unarmed merchant ship is a viola-
tion of the law of war,345 independent of neutrality rights, and is as illicit when 
directed at an enemy vessel as at a neutral. 346 
Hence, the Iranian retaliatory attacks on neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf 
are not justifiable as reprisals. Such attacks, therefore, represent an illicit use of 
force against neutral states. 347 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the acceptance under international law of the Paris Pact and U.N. 
Charter principles which make aggressive resort to war illegal, the customary law 
of neutrality, based on the presupposition that warring states have an equal claim 
of right in the belligerency, should be obsolete. The failure of collective security, 
however, through the U.N. Security Council's inability to take measures to 
declare the guilt of an aggressor or to restore the peace, requires the retention of 
retaliated only after a series of Iraqi strikes. See, e.g., Boston Globe, Dec. 27, 1984, at 1, col. 5. 
340. Whether attacks against commercial vessels trading with Iraq, were there any, see supra note 333, 
would be legal reprisals is outside the scope of this Comment. Such a hypothetical situation, however, 
would be similar to the German unrestricted submarine warfare reprisals whose legality has been 
roundly rejected. See supra notes 290-95 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra notes 300-05 and accompanying text. 
342. Professor Tucker's analysis, see supra notes 300-05 and accompanying text, though general in its 
terms, refers exclusively to the British reprisals in the World Wars and appears to exclude the German 
"reprisals," if only by operation of legal reasoning, as the text accompanying infra notes 344-47 will 
illustrate. See Tucker, supra note 10, at 254-58. 
343. The neutrality right to which the Tucker analysis applies is the right of neutral states to continue 
trade with belligerents subject only to the accepted limitations of blockade and contraband. See supra 
note 16. 
344. See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text. Permissible actions under the Tucker analysis 
might be similar to the British quasi-blockade: greatly expanded control over neutral commerce with 
the offending belligerent. See supra notes 114-23, 135-41 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 179, 230, 270. 
346. See supra note 179. 
347. Thus, the Iranian use of force presumably would be a violation of article 2, paragraph 4 of the 
U.N. Charter. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Saudi Arabia and the other nations of the 
Persian Gulf did bring the matter of Iranian reprisals to the Security Council in June, 1984. See 
NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1984, at 19. These nations introduced a resolution to condemn Iran for "aggres-
sion," which is ironic in light of Iraqi commencement of both the war and the attacks on shipping. See 
TIME, June 4, 1984, at 30. See 21 U.N. CHRONICLE (No.5) 5-10 (1984) for an account of the Security 
Council debate. 
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customary neutrality rights in the modern era. 
Iraq's declaration of the Kharg Island exclusion zone and subsequent attacks 
on neutral shipping therein are illegal under international law. Justification of 
these attacks, which are themselves violative of the law of war, cannot be made 
under the concept of an exclusion zone, as the concept has no validity under 
international law. Nor can such attacks be associated with the enforcement of an 
effective blockade under customary doctrine. Because of the illegality of the 
method of enforcement, the blockade must be deemed ineffective as a matter of 
law. 
Iranian reprisals against neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf, justified as 
retaliation for Iraqi attacks and very similar thereto, are themselves illegal. 
Legitimate reprisals cannot be taken against neutrals; they must be directed at 
the opposing belligerent. 
Thus, both belligerents' attacks on neutral vessels in the Persian Gulf are illicit. 
Neutral nations whose ships have suffered attacks may have therefore a right to 
moral or material reparation. 
Maxwell Jenkins 
ApPENDIX ONE 
Map courtesy of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (c. Ragland) 
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